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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

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IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (17 Mar 67) FOR OT 1234 21 March 1967

SUBJECT: ~~Operational Report~~ Lessons Learned Headquarters,
5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) 1st Special Forces

TO:

SEE DISTRIBUTION

9 Operational Report for quarterly
period ending 31 Oct-66.

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces for quarterly period ending 31 October 1966. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

18 OACSFOR

Kenneth G. Wickham

1 Incl
a/s

19 OT-RD-660565

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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(Continued on page 2)

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1st SPECIAL FORCES

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OPERATIONAL REPORT
FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD
ENDING 31 OCTOBER 1966

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CY 5 OF 40 CYS

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES
APO San Francisco 96240

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THRU: Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
APO US Forces 96307

THRU: Commander-in-Chief
United States Army, Pacific
APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington D.C. 20310

SECTION 1 (S) SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. (C) General: During the reporting period no large scale assaults against Special Forces camps were initiated by Viet Cong forces, although there were strong indications of large unit Viet Cong build-ups in the vicinity of Camps Khe Sanh, Tien Muoc and Ha Thanh in I Corps; Plei Djereng, Duc Co, and Duc Lap in II Corps; and Duc Phong, Loc Ninh, Trai Bi, Soui Da and Minh Thanh in III Corps. The Viet Cong did however initiate 275 small unit actions against Special Forces camps, Forward Operating Bases and friendly initiated combat operations. In most cases these actions were limited to light probes which were quickly suppressed by friendly forces assisted by the rapid response of flareships, Forward Air Controllers, airstrikes and artillery. In contrast to past activity, the US Special Forces advised CIDG forces assumed the aggressive attitude, seeking out and destroying the Viet Cong in his own

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habitat. This aggressive attitude was most evident in the IV Corps Tactical Zone. During this period there was a steady growth in the conduct of joint CIDG/FWMAF combat operations within all of the Corps Tactical Zones. These operations greatly enhanced the CIDG program in respect to relationship, understanding and esteem of FWMAF personnel towards the CIDG and in combat experience to the individual CIDG soldier. At the end of this period the 5th Special Forces Group was advising 37,721 CIDG personnel assigned to the 97 Special Forces camps throughout the Republic of Vietnam (Incl #1). In addition, advisory influence was exerted over 13,986 RF and 14,152 PF troops through the assigned additional mission of the sector and subsector advisory role. To determine the overall value and operational effectiveness of the CIDG camps, two studies were conducted during this period. The first designed to determine the reaction to intelligence (Incl #2) and the second to determine the camp operational effectiveness (Incl #3) of each CIDG camp in country. Both of these studies proved to be highly successful in their designed intentions and were further implemented at the "C" detachment level. A marked increase in Long Range Reconnaissance and Intelligence Gathering capabilities was attained with the implementation of Project OMEGA (Incl #4) and Project SIGMA (Incl #5) in addition to the already existing Project DELTA (Incl #6). The assets of these three special projects greatly increased our capability of providing reconnaissance and intelligence gathering support to FWMAF units in I, II, and III Corps Tactical Zones and to all CIDG camps throughout the Republic. At the direction of COMUSMACV, the MACV Recon School (Incl #7) was organized, with operational responsibility being delegated to the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne). This school, though still in its infancy, has already proven its worth through the high quality of training presented for the replacements assigned to reconnaissance units of US Combat Forces. In other areas related to the support of our operational detachments deployed in the field was the publication of the "A" Detachment Camp Planning Handbook (Incl #9) to guide detachments in the planning and construction of a camp; and the publication of the "A" Detachment Handbook (Incl #10) to assist the detachment in the accomplishment of its mission. In order to reinforce any Special Forces camp which was considered to be vulnerable or under the threat of imminent Viet Cong attack, a Camp Hardening Program (Incl #11) was initiated. Briefings were conducted for numerous visitors to include Presidential Envoy Mr Joe Holt and General Harold K. Johnson (Incl #12). These briefings greatly enhanced the overall understanding of the Special Forces effort in Vietnam. During the latter part of this quarter, the 21st Military History Detachment (Incl #13) was attached to the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne). The 21st MHD should prove to be highly instrumental in the collection of information from the field to supplement and augment the account of events as recorded by this Headquarters. Emphasis was placed on morale factors during this period to include both the USASF and CIDG personnel. In this respect, maximum participation in the R&R program was stressed and a monthly magazine, The "Green Beret" (Incl #14) came into being, for the benefit and enjoyment of USASF personnel. As a morale incentive for the CIDG forces, the "Order of the Green Scarf" (Incl #15) was established for the recognition of success in combat of CIDG units.

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2. (C) Intelligence: During this reporting period the Group S-2 initiated specific activities which will result in magnifying and increasing the intelligence collection and production effort within the command. These activities included: Establishment of a Combined Intelligence Center (CIC) at selected camps (Incl #15); Consolidation of intelligence nets (Incl #17); Special Forces Weather Observation Program (Incl #18); The establishment of the "C" Detachment Information Analysis Center (Incl #19); and the arrival of the 403rd Special Operations Detachment. For the benefit of intelligence personnel from subordinate detachments, three one week IPW courses were conducted. The instruction, including the interrogation of captives and handling of captured documents and materiel, was presented by intelligence personnel from the S-2 section and the 519th MI Battalion. The course of instruction also included the actual interrogation by students of enemy captives presently held by local GVN agencies. As a follow-up to the instruction, the 5th Special Forces Group is publishing new regulations pertaining to the procedures for handling, processing and exploitation of captives, returnees, suspects, documents and materiel. The implementation of these regulations will result in the subordinate detachments receiving maximum timely information and intelligence.

a. The weather exerts a definite and, at times, decisive influence on military operations. In Vietnam, the 5th Weather Squadron of the 1st Weather Group is specifically assigned the mission of providing weather service support to the US forces in Vietnam. Personnel resources available to the 1st Weather Group in Vietnam do not permit establishing the number of weather observing stations needed to satisfy the requirement for weather observations. It was necessary, therefore, to call upon elements of the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) to provide limited weather observations to supplement those available from Air Weather Service and other meteorological agencies. Detachments of the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) are ideally located for this purpose, and have the additional advantage of having organic communications to relay the observations to locations where they are needed by forecasters. Accordingly, the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) and the 1st Weather Group have published and distributed appropriate regulations and handbooks, respectively, requiring observers at selected Special Forces camps to make surface weather observations (see Incl #18).

b. It has long been an accepted fact that the Special Forces "A" detachment has been the Group's primary source of information. In many cases in the past, however, the flow of information to higher headquarters has not been matched with an equal flow of timely intelligence feeding back to the "A" detachment. An Information Analysis Center (IAC) has been organized at each of the four "C" detachments from personnel resources currently on hand. At full strength, it will incorporate military intelligence augmentation that has been coordinated with MACV-J2. The mission of the IAC

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is to absorb, collate and return expeditiously to the "A" detachment, timely intelligence. Briefly, the IAC assimilates information flowing in from the "A" and "B" detachments, while at the same time tapping sources of information available at Corps and higher level headquarters. The information which is returned to the "A" detachment is not expected to be polished, but will be timely and will include order of battle information, translations of documents, results of PW interrogations and analysis of current Viet Cong capabilities and intentions. At the same time this information will be forwarded to elements of major US combat units operating in the vicinity of the "A" detachments. Inclosure #19, LOI-IAC, outlines in detail the organization, procedures and responsibilities of the "C" detachment and the IAC.

c. A vital portion of the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) intelligence collection effort will be provided by the 403rd SOD (RRU) which arrived in Vietnam in October and is presently under the operational control of the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) Commanding Officer.

3. (C) Operations and Training Activities:

a. Plans:

(1) During this quarter, the plan for the expansion of Project DELTA capabilities was implemented and included in the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) concept of operations to achieve overall objectives through CY1967 (Incl #20).

(2) The Mobile Guerrilla Force concept (Incl #21) was also included in the concept of operations.

(3) A revised MTOE will be submitted in the near future superseding the one which was forwarded on 7 June 1966.

b. Operations: Throughout the entirety of Vietnam, there was an overall rise in the degree of effectiveness of combat operations conducted by CIDG forces both as separate units and in joint operations conducted with FVMAF units. The aggressive attitude assumed by the CIDG forces proved to have a devastating impact on the Viet Cong, especially in the IV Corps Tactical Zone. As a result of CIDG operations conducted country wide, a total of 217 Viet Cong were killed during this quarter, establishing a favorable Viet Cong/CIDG kill ratio of 3.2:1. This ratio reflects an overall decrease in comparison to the previous quarterly period. Comparative casualty figures by Corps Tactical Zone and country wide are shown at inclosures #22, #23, #24, and #25. Operations of mention and actions of interest, by Corps Tactical Zone and special project operations, are outlined below:

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(1) I Corps Tactical Zone:

(a) Hardening of Camp Khe Sanh: Of the 9 CIDG camps in I CTZ, the only one that could be considered "hardened" during this quarter was Camp Khe Sanh. In September, General Westmoreland directed that Khe Sanh be "hardened" to prevent a possible overwhelming enemy attack upon it. The decision to harden Khe Sanh resulted from MACV J-2 intelligence estimates that the NVA enemy had the capability of attacking the camp with large forces, which would tend to cause sizeable USMC reaction forces to reinforce or to counterattack. Enemy forces of in excess of 3 divisions were estimated capable of attacking USMC relief columns. Strengthening of Khe Sanh began immediately to prevent this possible occurrence. Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), authorized an increase in CIDG strength from 3 to 4 companies and directed that USASF personnel strength be augmented with specialists and technicians needed to implement an increased intelligence collection and terrain reconnaissance and surveillance capability. III MAF contributed to the hardening by emplacing two 155mm howitzers and three 105mm howitzers in the camp; deploying the 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines, around the camp in a security mission; providing elements of a Navy construction battalion unit (Seabee) to repair the deteriorated airstrip; obtaining Project Delta assets for long range reconnaissance missions in and near the Khe Sanh TAOR; and by directing USAF C-123 defoliation missions flown in portions of the TAOR. Detachment C-1, Danang, provided personnel and equipment to strengthen the USASF detachments intelligence and surveillance capability and its operational capability; provided construction and barrier material to increase the defensibility of the camp; and defoliated the perimeter of the camp by helicopter. Lessons learned during the hardening of Camp Khe Sanh are outlined in Section 2, Part I.

(b) Viet Cong Activity at Camp Ha Thanh: On the night of 10-11 September, enemy forces of an estimated battalion size conducted simultaneous assaults on RF/PF outposts in the vicinity of Camp Ha Thanh and conducted a heavy mortar/recoilless rifle bombardment on the CIDG camp itself. Poor communications prevented the district chief from effectively communicating with the OP's. The OP's were weak and the southern chain extending some 6 kilometers south of the CIDG camp could not be supported by fire. At approximately 110130 hours the two OP's adjacent to the airstrip and overlooking the camp were overrun. From these two OP's, the enemy was able to place accurate direct fire into the camp. Tactical aircraft conducted continuous airstrikes on the enemy throughout the night, while flareships provided illumination. At dawn the enemy broke off the assault, but continued to occupy the overrun OP's to the south, while withdrawing from the two OP's adjacent to the camp. On the evening of the 11th, the enemy renewed harassing mortar and recoilless rifle fire on the camp. At approximately 2030 hours on the 12th, the camp was reinforced by a Mike Force company. Lessons learned during this period of Viet Cong activity are discussed in Section 2, Part I.

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(c) Activities at Camp Tien Phuoc: During this Quarter, two significant actions occurred at Tien Phuoc. The first of these was a combat engagement approximately 5 kilometers east of the camp between two CIDG companies (plus) and elements of the NVA 72nd Battalion reinforced by the local force V-13 company. The second incident was a Viet Cong attack on a 38 man RF/PF/PAF outpost on Nui Dong Hill. Several lessons were learned during these two incidents, and are discussed in Section 2, Part I.

(2) II Corps Tactical Zone: The most significant occurrences in II CTZ during the quarterly period were the conversion of CIDG camps Buon Ea Yang and Plei Do Lin to Regional Force. In both instances, the conversion was effected successfully, bringing to light a number of areas for improvement prior to further conversions. Some of the areas are being corrected at this level. Most problem areas should be alleviated in future conversions by the publication of the "Conversion Handbook". Other problem areas that arose were directly related to the authorization, structure and support of the Regional Force, which required decisions and action by higher headquarters.

(3) III Corps Tactical Zone: Activity in the III Corps area was limited to small unit contacts with Viet Cong forces, with no major significant engagements. Combat operations were significant as a whole, in as much as joint operations with FVMAF units increased greatly over the previous quarter. These operations have greatly enhanced the relationship between the CIDG forces and the FVMAF units.

(4) IV Corps Tactical Zone: Numerous achievements were attained in IV CTZ during this quarterly period. Among these were the successful conversion of Camp An Phu from CIDG to Regional Force; combat operations on Phu Quoc Island; a joint combat operation conducted by Camps Kinh Quan II and Moc Hoa; and relief operations conducted in conjunction with severe flooding conditions throughout the operational areas of camps in the Mekong Delta.

(a) Conversion of CIDG Camp An Phu: On 1 August 1966, Camp An Phu was successfully converted from CIDG to Regional Force. The conversion of this camp was highly significant, not only due to the smooth change-over, but also because it had been the first Special Forces camp in the Republic to assume the additional mission of the subsector advisory role.

(b) Combat Operations on Phu Quoc Island: On 10 September offensive combat operations fashioned after the "Malayan Fan" Modus Operandi were initiated. In general, the tactics employed entail continuous reconnaissance-ambush operations with a continually increasing TAOR. To date these operations have been highly successful, both in the counter guerrilla and intelligence fields (Incl #26).

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(c) Joint Operation Conducted by Camps Vinh Quan II and Moc Hoa: A joint combat operation conducted on 16 October, by Detachment A-414 (Moc Hoa) and Detachment A-416 (Vinh Quan II) proved to be significant in that it displayed the vulnerability of VC safe areas during the high water periods of the rainy season; emphasized the importance and effectiveness of waterborne operations; and exemplified the coordination and cooperation of combined forces to include the US Navy (Incl #27).

(d) Relief Operations: Due to extremely high water level during the month of September and October severe flooding conditions were experienced throughout the IV CTZ area, with several of the CIDG camps experiencing water levels of up to 16 feet inside the camp walls. Relief operations conducted in support of the camps affected by the high waters included daily food resupply runs; evacuation of CIDG dependents; construction and air landing/dropping of rafts and floating helicopter pads; continuous resupply of construction materials; evacuation of crew served weapons (105mm howitzers, .50 cal MG, 4.2 in mortars etc.,) to prevent damage; standby TAC air, flare-ships, gunships and FAC aircraft; and airborne radio relay aircraft during hours of darkness over vulnerable camps. The overall support provided was outstanding to include that which was extended to the civilian population throughout the area. Support provided to the civilian population is covered in more detail in paragraph 5.

(5) Project OMEGA: Since activation, Project OMEGA has conducted two major operations. The most significant of these was Operation CLINTON, conducted during the period 1-30 October, under operational control of I Force V. The results of this operation (Incl #28) were highly profitable in the intelligence gathered for use in planning future FVMAF operations.

(6) Project DELTA: During the reporting period Project DELTA conducted the following activities:

(a) General:

1. Operational days - 66
2. Training days - 18
3. Movement days - 8

(b) Training:

1. During the period, 18 days of refresher training and special selected subjects were presented to assigned personnel.

2. A 21 day course of instruction on Long Range Patrol Techniques (LHRP School Course Nr 5) was conducted during the month of August for 9 US personnel from the 1st Cav Division; 30 from the 173rd Brigade (Abn); 10 from the 4th Infantry Division; and 4 from the 5th SF Group (Abn).

(c) Combat Operations:

1. The following operations were conducted during this quarter:

OPERATION	PERIOD	CORPS AREA	OPCON
10-66	9 Aug - 5 Sep	III	VN III Corps and II Force V
11-66	9 Sep - 10 Sep	II	I Force V
12-66	25 Sep - 4 Oct	III	CG, III Corps
13-66	14 Oct -	I	CG, III MAF

2. During these operations Reconnaissance and Roadrunner Teams and Ranger Companies were committed as follows:

OPERATION	RECON TEAMS	ROADRUNNER TEAMS	RANGER OPERATIONS
10-66	10	5	2
11-66	1	0	0
12-66	4	2	6
13-66	3	4	1

(7) Project SIGMA: Since activation, Project SIGMA has conducted 4 operations as follows:

- (a) Operation GOLF (10-18 Sep)
- (b) Operation SHAKEDOWN (14-16 Sep)
- (c) Operation TAZEWELL (23 Sep - 5 Oct)
- (d) Operation FONDULAC (12-25 Oct)

The operations resulted in 48 VC killed; the discovery of VC land line communications systems and the gathering of a wealth of intelligence for planning of future operations.

c. Training:

(1) The following courses of instruction were conducted at the Dong Ba Thin VNSF/CIDG Training Center:

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<u>COURSE</u>	<u>PERIOD CONDUCTED</u>	<u>GRADUATES</u>
7th VNSF Officers and EM Course	30 May - 27 Aug	109
VNSF Basic EM Course	25 Jul - 27 Aug	81
15th CRP Course	10 Jul - 22 Aug	132
16th CRP Course	31 Aug - 3 Oct	119
17th CIDG Leadership Course	12 Jul - 17 Aug	137
18th CIDG Leadership Course	24 Aug - 28 Sep	137
	TOTAL:	715

(2) Airboat Training: Commencing on 15 October and continuing throughout the remainder of the month, Detachment C-4 (Can Tho) conducted airboat training for indigenous personnel.

d. Aviation: The 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) received Army aviation support from the units under the operational control of the Group Commander and from each Corps Tactical Zone on a mission request basis. The Group Commander had operational control of the 281st Aviation Company (AML), 7 CV-2B aircraft, and 3 U-1A aircraft. During the quarterly period, the 281st Aviation Company (AML) operated at 60% TOE aviator strength. Despite this handicap, the unit flew 1749 missions in support of special combat operations and 5,405 missions in support of the 97 Special Forces sites located throughout South Vietnam. One hundred and six missions were flown in support of the MACV Recondo School which conducted its first class in September 1966. The air movement section shipped 23,814,744 pounds of cargo and 7,132 troops from the Special Forces Operational Base at Nha Trang. Cargo and troops were moved through both the Air Force aerial port system utilizing C-123 and C-130 aircraft and the Special Forces air movement system using CV-2B and U-1A aircraft. The combination of the aerial port system and the Special Forces air movement system provided timely means of supporting 86,000 men through airlanding and airdropping of supplies and equipment.

e. Combat Development: In the field of combat developments, the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) has been quite selective in what it approves as necessary items to be procured. We have tested many items and concepts, as the needs of our subordinate units run the gamut of military and non-military activities in South Vietnam. Hardware which has been approved by this Headquarters, usually on a mission essential basis, has proven to be invaluable. This quarter the items mentioned do not fall into the combat development phase of operations. It is necessary to include them in this portion because of the conceptual revisions involved in the employment of equipment such as airboats and AN/PPS-5 radar sets. As significant lessons are learned through the use of these items the results will be included for proper dissemination. The discussion and observations on airboats, PPS-5 radar sets, night observation devices, long shaft motors, chemilluminescent panels and site marker balloons are discussed in Section 2 Part I.

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4. (C) Logistics:

a. General:

(1) During the reporting period the Logistical Support Center in Nha Trang, with a liaison detachment in Saigon, continued providing logistical support to all personnel in support of Parasol-Switchback projects. A thirty-four percent changeover of LSC personnel occurred during the reporting period.

(2) A logistical summary submitted by the "C" detachment S-4's every Friday was initiated. This report covers problem areas encountered by the "C" detachments and also lists any critical supplies. When received at the Logistical Support Center follow up action is then taken.

(3) Reorganization of S-4 Office. During the month of August the S-4 Office and subordinate sections were reorganized. The administrative section, hand receipt section and offices within the Logistical Support Center were relocated within the building to provide closer control and coordination.

b. Supply:

(1) Requisitions for all classes of supplies and equipment except class III and V are still being submitted to the Counterinsurgency Support Office (CISO) 2D Logistical Command, APO 96248 Okinawa. However, on 14 October 1966 an Interservice Support Agreement, DD Form 1194, was initiated and approved between the United States Army, Vietnam and the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne). This agreement constitutes authority to requisition common class II & IV equipment and supplies and limited class I from the 1st Logistical Command on a reimbursable basis. The 1st Logistical Command will bill the Counter Insurgency Support Office, Okinawa for those items which are issued to the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne). Every effort is being made to maintain an adequate stockage level (60 days) of sufficient supplies and equipment at the Logistical Support Center.

(2) Procurement action has been initiated for seventy-three Radar Sets AN/PPS-5. These sets will be allocated to selected operational "A" detachments when received. The first twenty-four sets which arrive in Vietnam from CONUS have been allocated to the Group by COMUSMACV.

(3) Procurement action has been effected by the United States Army Materiel Command, Washington, D.C. for one hundred and sixty 10 KW generators; Diesel, Watercooled, USAF model MB-5. Standard US Army 10 KW generators, air cooled, have not proven satisfactory for PIR requirements. The 10 KW generator is the prime source of power for all electrical equipment to include food storage cabinets and radios in all Special Forces Camps.

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When installed they run continuously or, when possible, in alternation with another set. The present air cooled, model generators were not designed for extended periods of operation in a warm climate. Therefore, it is felt that the procurement of the more durable water cooled, diesel models, will greatly improve generator life and provide the detachments with a far better power source.

(4) Fourteen Model M101, 105mm Howitzers were procured from in-country sources during the reporting period. These weapons are being utilized by the more isolated camps to improve their defensive positions and to provide additional offensive supporting fires. Howitzers were issued on the basis of two per detachment.

(5) An audit team from Combined Area Studies Group conducted an inspection of stock record cards and associated supply records to include the Logistical Support Center's Operational Fund during the month of August. It was noted that procedures and expenditures were in accordance with pertinent regulations governing Parasol-Switchback projects.

(6) A total of one-hundred trucks, ambulance, front line $\frac{1}{4}$ ton, M-718 were received during the reporting period. These trucks are being issued to the "C" detachments for distribution to subordinate detachments within their Corps areas.

(7) To date twenty-four out of fifty-three airboats have been received. Seventeen of these are operated by the Det C-4 Mike Force.

(8) During the reporting period Detachments C-3 and C-4 have assumed the additional role of operating as forward supply points. This has resulted in many benefits, the most important of which is that it reduces the order-ship time for requisitions placed by the operational detachments. A further benefit is that the supplies for any given area are now placed under the control of the "C" detachment commands who in turn can establish priorities based on a more intimate knowledge of the situations which prevail within his Corps area. Also, rather than having all supplies concentrated in one location they are dispersed. The only Corps area which is not operating a forward supply point is II Corps. Due to the size of II Corps it is felt that it would be better to operate forward supply points from two locations. Presently plans are being made for their decentralization, however, no date has been established for their conversion. All supplies for II Corps detachments are being shipped from the Logistical Support Center.

(9) Effective 1 September 1966 a system of Quarterly Droppage was instituted. Each "A" detachment is permitted \$100 a quarter for droppage of expendable and minor non-expendable items. This has greatly decreased the number of Relief from Responsibility requests received by this Headquarters.

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(10) Regulation 75-1, Malfunction Reports Ammunition and Explosives. This regulation was published and distributed on 26 September.

(11) Regulation 725-1, Issues of Supplies and Equipment Material Priority Systems was published on 30 September. This regulation establishes command policy and prescribes procedures for the assignment of Issue Priority Designators (IPD) to requisitions prepared by the Logistical Support Center in support of Parasol-Switchback Projects.

(12) Regulation 750-2, Vehicle Bumper Markings, dated 25 September 1966, was written and published. This regulation prescribes a uniform system of vehicle bumper markings to be used throughout the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne).

(13) During the past three months, nine LST's and one deep draft vessel arrived from Okinawa with cargo for the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne).

(14) Because of the critical nature and high pilferage rate of medical supplies the Logistical Support Center has commenced consolidating shipments and packing these supplies in locked ~~conax~~ containers. A key or copy of the combination used is forwarded by mail to the requesting detachment.

(15) During the past six months many supplies which were shipped either from CONUS depots or Okinawa would arrive at Cam Rahn Bay without advance notification. As a result bi-weekly checks are now being made at the port facilities in Cam Rahn Bay for our supplies. This has eliminated misrouted and lost supplies arriving through that facility.

(16) With the decentralization of each Corps area the requisitioning procedure from the forward supply point to the Logistical Support Center will have to be changed. It is proposed that the system established be similar to that which is presently in effect between the Logistical Support Center and the Counterinsurgency Support Office. That is, the forward supply point maintain a stockage list of all fast-moving items within the CIDG program. The stockage list is based upon the requirements of the particular Corps area and may be revised every fifteen days based upon current needs and demands. When the "C" detachment submits their stockage list the amount on hand will be annotated and the difference automatically shipped to them in bulk lots.

c. Rigger Section:

(1) During the period covered, the Rigger Section had an average assigned strength of 41 EM and one WO. Nine riggers included in the above total are performing duty with the "C" detachments.

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(2) During the reporting period the following quantities of supplies were rigged for air drop and air land:

	<u>AIR LAND</u>	<u>AIR DROP</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
August	5,376,114	234,682	5,610,796
September	6,572,439	460,379	7,032,818
October	10,387,201	283,929	<u>10,671,130</u>
Total pounds (3 month period):			23,814,744

(3) During the reporting period the following parachutes were packed:

	<u>T-10</u>	<u>RESERVE</u>	<u>T-7A</u>	<u>C-13</u>
August	107	265	1,467	60
September	693	541	1,738	
October	887	650	1,199	206
Total parachutes packed (3 month period):	7,813			

(4) Nine tons of assorted munitions were rigged for emergency resupply and positioned adjacent to the rigging ramp. In addition, eighteen air drop pallets complete with A-7A straps attached were prepositioned near the rigging ramp. This provides readiness back-up when emergency rigging is required for non-standard loads and will result in a time savings should such situations arise.

(5) During the past three months, many changes were made within the rigging warehouse itself resulting in an increase in storage space and working area. Because of an increase in the amount of parachutes and air items being kept on hand, it was necessary to construct storage bins. These bins (56) are being utilized for the storage of all packed parachutes. Further, since the Vietnamese Special Forces are soon to get their own parachute packing facility, they have moved their equipment to the support area which has resulted in an additional 600 square feet of storage space being made available. During the interim period, they still utilize our facilities for repack. As a result of these improvements and the move of the Vietnamese Special Forces, equipment which was previously stored in conex containers is now being stored within the parachute shed. As a result, 28 conex containers have been released and turned over to supply.

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d. Food Service:

(1) Requirements for the indigenous long range patrol rations which are procured from Japan have increased 50% over the past six months. This has resulted in maximum output on the part of the contractor in Japan. It is felt however, that quantities presently being received will satisfy requirements during the next six months.

(3) Since the 1st Logistical Command commenced purchasing food on the economy in Dalat for U.S. units, it was felt that this would effect food prices in that area. Many of the food contractors for the CIDG program are purchasing from this area. A check was made by the Food Service Officer and it was determined that if the present procurement rate by the 1st Logistical Command continues, the CIDG food contractors will remain unaffected. However, an increase in quantities demanded by the U.S. units would result in a rise in prices.

e. Maintenance Facility:

(1) The Repair Parts Section of the Logistical Support Center was moved from the Supply Section to the Maintenance Facility. This section has the responsibility of handling all requisitions submitted by the using detachments, maintaining a stock control section (recording demands and establishing requisitioning objectives) and ordering all parts for stockage either from the Counterinsurgency Support Office or through the newly established Interservice Support Agreement with United States Army, Vietnam.

(2) The bulk of all repair parts are now being shipped by US Mail from the local APO. This has greatly enhanced small items reaching their destination without the possibility of pilferage and has eliminated the long lead time formerly experienced in waiting for an aircraft load to accumulate. Aircraft schedules are furnished daily by Air Movements to the Maintenance Facility so that items (usually those which are heavy and bulky) may be shipped out on opportune aircraft as soon as possible. The average time used to process spare parts requisitions has been reduced to between one and three days.

(3) Within the Maintenance Facility several new buildings and projects have been completed:

(a) Two new covered automotive bays were constructed with an inspection pit built into the floor to facilitate ease of inspection. The inspection pit is equipped with interior lights and electric outlets for drop cords.

(b) An A frame was made with an electric hoist to assist in lifting out old assemblies in the automotive shop.

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(c) A new shop office and production control center were established and are now functioning.

(d) A new machine shop equipped with a five foot bed lathe machine with ten inch throw, a portable milling machine which can be attached to the lathe, a grinding machine, a table mounted drill press, a seven foot high speed adjustable drill press capable of honing out cylinders of engine blocks, a valve grinding machine, and a locally fabricated machine for re-facing scored brake drums have been added to increase the maintenance support capability.

(e) The new paint shop, tire shop, generator shop, and welding shop are also now operational.

(f) A shed is being constructed which will accomodate much of the work that is presently being done outside. This will provide an additional 300 square feet of covered work area.

(g) A Group Motor Pool was established in the old Logistical Support Center vehicle holding area. The motor pool takes care of all 1st echelon maintenance for the headquarters vehicles. Motor stables are performed each morning at 0715 hours and all vehicles are properly dispatched before leaving the facility. This has improved control and accountability of all wheeled vehicles.

(h) The refrigeration and rewind shops were moved from the Power Plant to within the Maintenance Facility. These moves consolidated all maintenance activities within the SFOB.

(4) A new, up to date Prescribed Load List (PLL) was submitted to the Counterinsurgency Support Office during October. This list comprises some 4,700 line items (repair parts), and covers virtually all of the different makes and models of equipment now supported by the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne). The main goal of this PLL is to achieve, for each separate detachment, a specified amount of repair parts to enable them to better perform maintenance on their assigned equipment.

(5) During this quarter a Mobile Maintenance Contact Team was formed. The mission of the team is to provide the operational detachments with a direct support maintenance capability. Further benefits result in that the contact team provides refresher or additional training to the USASF personnel on new items brought into the supply system. The team is also able to make accurate evaluations of maintenance programs in the field.

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(6) Construction has commenced on a consolidated Materiel Handling Equipment and Heavy Engineer Equipment Pool. This consolidation will net closer maintenance supervision of this equipment, particularly the MHE. Drivers will be assigned to each piece of equipment to include night crews so that twenty-four hour support can be provided when required or when receiving supplies from out of country.

(7) In order to reduce equipment deadline, the Signal Service Message was instigated. This has proven to be the fastest method of receiving support and replaces the normal requisition. The Signal Service Message is used when equipment is deadlined which seriously impares the operational capability of the unit. Requests received each day are filled when received if parts are available and mailed or air shipped the same day whenever possible.

(8) Since Special Forces' entry in Vietnam much of the equipment which has been issued is no longer in the normal Army supply system or is nonstandard. As a result repair parts replacement has become increasingly difficult and costly. Therefore, whenever this equipment is uneconomically repairable it is cannibalized for the remaining repair parts and then turned in through normal property disposal channels. This eliminates an out-dated item of equipment from our system and provides repair parts for the remaining equipment.

f. Repairs and Utilities:

(1) During the reporting period the following construction projects were completed:

(a) Two wells were dug which are producing 2,000 gallons of water per hour.

(b) Three ground water storage tanks capable of storing 90,000 gallons of water were built.

(c) A repairs and utilities building with offices and supply room was finished.

(d) A seven meter by forty meter two story BOQ capable of housing forty-two officers was completed.

(e) Two two-story troop billets were finished which are capable of housing eighty-two enlisted personnel.

(f) A wing was added to the headquarters building which includes a classified briefing room.

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(g) A lumber storage shed was finished.

(2) The following construction projects have been started but are not complete:

(a) Ten troop billets for the 281st Avn Co.

(b) A second wing for the headquarters building which will contain the command and staff offices.

(c) A PX extension which will increase the floor space by 220 square meters.

(3) In order to cut down on in-country spending a stockage list of all materials for the Repairs and Utilities Section was made up and consolidated for order from the Counterinsurgency Support Office. In addition to cutting down on in-country spending, it is felt that material of a better quality will be received thus decreasing replacement requirements.

(4) With the expansion of facilities in the Special Forces Operational Base it was determined that the power for operating was insufficient. As a result, transformers which will boost voltage from 220 volts at the source to 25,000 volts on the lines and back to 200 volts at the destination will be installed. This will eliminate loss of power through the lines and also the use of individual transformers in each building.

5. (C) Civil Affairs:

a. During this reporting period, the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) has continued to attack problem areas in order to maintain the impetus of the overall Group program in civil affairs and psychological operations. Increased efforts in all functional areas have led to significant expansion of the total program, particularly in the areas of agriculture, health and sanitation, education, and public information. Emphasis has also intensified on the implementation of long-term planning and programming to assure program continuity and to facilitate determination of personnel and budgetary requirements. Command emphasis has focused on the integration of military operations, intelligence, civic action and psychological operations with the Vietnamese National Revolutionary Development Program.

b. During the three month reporting period ending 31 October 1966, 1,814 civic action projects designed to gain the support of the local civilians and to expand the CVN area of control and influence were completed in Special Forces operational areas. Included in this figure are the construction and/or repair of: 123 schools; 28 dispensaries, 11 hospitals, 36 bridges, 39 latrines, 29 fish ponds, 83 wells, 526 dwellings, and 37 VIS information booths. Other

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projects included provision of 1,459,769 pounds of food for over 18,127 refugees who are located in detachment operational areas. USASF and VNSF medics, and Special Forces trained Village Hamlet Workers treated 343,349 patients in camp dispensaries while conducting 1,425 civic action medical patrols.

c. In an effort to bolster the medical programs of the GVN in the hamlets of rural Vietnam, the 5th SFGA has sponsored a twelve week training program for Hamlet Health Visitors. The four "C" detachments coordinated with the Provincial Medicine Chiefs' for instructors, facilities, training aids and necessary clinical facilities and field trips. Phase I of the program includes six weeks of classroom instruction in anatomy and physiology, first aid, sanitation, symptom diagnosis and treatment, pharmacology, and administration. Phase II is on-the-job training presented in the hamlet and includes midwifery training, malaria control, and village sanitation. During this phase the student conducts daily sick calls, house calls, and presents instruction to the hamlet members. The 5th SFGA will assist with salaries for the students for six months, commencing at the time of their enrollment. During this period the GVN will put these people on the Province payroll. and will assume responsibility for them at the end of the period. At present, there are 119 students undergoing this training in all four Corps Tactical Zones.

d. A motor maintenance program with the purpose of training and qualifying selected CIDG personnel to perform 1st and 2nd echelon maintenance and repair on vehicles and generators has been initiated during this quarter. One individual from each CIDG company is selected for attendance at the course. The 120 hour program of instruction includes classes on the fundamentals and repair of the lubrication, cooling, fuel, electrical and engine systems of military vehicles. The course includes 40 hours on trouble-shooting and maintenance of generators. To date there have been 96 graduates from this course; all have received a graduation kit of basic mechanics tools.

e. During the quarter, attention has continued to be placed on the agricultural program with emphasis on making the GVN system work. Fifty head of breeding cattle were obtained through the Ministry of Agriculture, with 30 already delivered into II CTZ. This was a first for the GVN, and is proof that the system can work. By continuing this program, there will be an increase in livestock, along with an improved economy and diet. The kitchen-garden program continues to expand with over 883 pounds of new seed shipped this quarter. The harvest of major grain is now in progress. Fish ponds are continuing to yield excellent results. 151 new ponds have been stocked with Tilapia fish this quarter. This program has been very beneficial in those areas where the population is suffering from a lack of protein in their diet, such as in the Central Highlands. I Corps has been successful in promoting rice banks in five districts. Rice is deposited at

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the district warehouse, to be drawn by the depositor on request. This program was slow in starting, but is beginning to catch on. It produces the favorable result of denying the Viet Cong access to large stores of rice, in addition to giving the people real confidence in their system of government.

f. The Mid-Autumn Festival (Tet Trung Thu) was celebrated country wide during the week of 25-30 September. Every detachment sponsored parties and presented the children with candy, toys and other gifts. The officials of the GVN at all levels were on hand to deliver speeches and help in the distribution of gifts. Many districts provided commodities from their own resources, which helped to make the festival a complete success.

g. 18,127 refugees returned to GVN control in the detachments operational areas during this quarter. Every effort has been made to use USAID and GVN resources to provide for the refugees. 1,459,769 pounds of food and 90,853 pounds of clothing were distributed by detachments to provide for refugee needs. To handle emergency influxes of refugees, the S-5, 5th SFGA maintains a prepackaged "Alpha" kit which contains food, clothing, medical supplies, and building materials to care for 100 refugees for thirty days.

h. The highlight of the civic action effort was the flood disaster relief provided to IV CTZ. Task Force Flood Relief was formed in September consisting of USASF, MACV, USAID and GVN personnel of IV CTZ. Priority supply and communication channels were established so that Corps, Division and USASF units could provide for their respective areas. Mass immunizations were accomplished prior to the flooding. Emergency food and medical supplies were requisitioned and on hand when needed. GVN supplied both boat and vehicular transport for moving dependents and civilians out of flooded areas. On 30-31 October, the Nha Trang area council solicited donations for the refugees of IV CTZ. This is the first time that one area of VN has come to the aid of another with financial assistance.

6. (C) Psychological Operations:

a. Perhaps the most outstanding psychological operations success to date in Vietnam was that of publicizing the National Constituent Assembly elections held on 11 September. A total of 81% of eligible voters cast their ballots on election day. The remarkable aspect of this PSYOP campaign was that it was conducted almost completely by the Vietnamese. VIS personnel worked tirelessly, utilizing all available media in a concerted effort to reach every potential voter. USASF provided advice, assistance, and certain material support in coordination with local JUSPAO representatives, however, VIS personnel did a generally outstanding job of organizing rallies, meetings, conferences, and orientation sessions dealing with the election. Representatives from Province and District traveled extensively among rural villages and hamlets and disseminated election information.

b. Training of CA/PSYOP Teams has been moving forward aggressively and is reaping valuable dividends in many "A" detachments. At Phu Tuc (Detachment A-224) the team has been issued distinctive scarves, thus providing a sense of identity and purpose. Team members have become well-known in the local area and are greatly respected for their assistance to the populace. They provide medical assistance, assist with CA projects, and unceasingly "spread the word" relative to GVN programs and objectives. Detachment C-4 conducted three separate two-week training courses at Can Tho for ten CA/PSYOP Teams.

c. The Chicou Hoi program continues to provide tangible evidence of the value of psychological operations, as the number of Hoi Chanhs has shown a generally rising trend this quarter. A total of 1,557 Hoi Chanhs have returned to GVN control as of 31 October 1966, within USASF operational areas. Families and friends of local force VC soldiers are increasingly being exploited to urge those individuals to return home to wives and families. The truth of GVN promises of good treatment to returnees is now firmly established in most areas. It is anticipated that with continued ARVN/FWMAF military victories and increasingly difficult conditions for the VC, the program will gain even greater momentum.

d. Flood relief activities in IV CTZ during September and October proved to thousands of citizens that their government could and would provide for their needs in an emergency. GVN administrative officials plunged enthusiastically into the task of furnishing food, clothing, shelter, and medical treatment to homeless flood victims. Doubtful political beliefs were largely forgotten in an effort to provide humanitarian relief supplies to every needy civilian. Follow-up psychological activities via radio newspaper, leaflets, and posters publicized the relief program to the maximum.

e. Circulation of the Montagnard Newspaper in II CTZ has been increased from 2,000 to 5,000 to 7,000 copies per month during this quarter. The newspaper is printed in Vietnamese as well as three of the most common Montagnard dialects and is read avidly by villagers. Although the low literacy rate is sometimes a limiting factor, those individuals who can read have been reading or relating news items to other villagers on numerous occasions. The popularity of this newspaper serves as a vivid example of the "hunger for news" among rural citizens of Vietnam.

f. Assignment of more than twenty CA/PSYOP officers to "A" detachments during October will provide a tremendous boost to the 5th SEGA CA/PSYOP Program. The majority of these officers are school-trained and all were thoroughly briefed on all aspects of the Group Program prior to their deployment to specific "A" camps.

g. Integration of PSYOP has been stressed to all commanders as a prime consideration during planning for and conduct of all military operations.

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Additionally, emphasis has been placed upon evaluation of results of PSYOP efforts after each operation. Such evaluations have assisted in determination of overall effectiveness of those activities and have, on various occasions, disclosed a need for follow-up activities, for adjustment of propaganda themes, or for addition or deletion of specific appeals.

h. Motivation Indoctrination Program training for CIDG troops has been conducted at the following "A" detachments during this reporting period:

- (1) Khe Sanh A-101
- (2) Tra Bong A-107
- (3) Cung Son A-221
- (4) Dong Tre A-222
- (5) Ben Soi A-321
- (6) Soui Da A-322
- (7) Duc Phong A-343
- (8) Tuyen Nhon A-415
- (9) Phu Quoc A-426
- (10) Tan Chau A-428

i. The attached inclosures, #29, #30, #31, and #32, represent successful implementation of Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations techniques when applied in a timely and conscientious manner.

7. (C) Personnel and Administration:

a. Authorized Personnel Changes: Current and projected operational requirements has necessitated a further evaluation of the MTOE which was submitted to USARV on 7 June 1966. The results of this evaluation will be reported in the next ORLL.

b. Personnel Attrition:

- (1) Assigned strength 31 Oct 66, 2589.
- (2) Casualty figures are listed in inclosure #23.

c. Legal Assistance: On 15 August 1966, a legal handbook (Incl #33) was published and distributed throughout the command. This handbook was designed to provide legal guidance and assistance to 5th SFG (Abn) members who might be directed subsequently to conduct investigations, serve on courts and boards or perform other activities of a legal nature.

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d. Visitors: The 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) hosted 29 distinguished visitors and 14 standard visitors during the reporting period. Both classified and unclassified briefings were given.

e. Awards and Decorations: 994 awards and decorations were processed. The breakdown is as follows:

Distinguished Flying Cross	-	1
Distinguished Service Cross	-	3
Silver Star	-	15
Soldiers Medal	-	1
Legion of Merit	-	5
Bronze Star "V"	-	60
Bronze Star Medal	-	195
Air Medal	-	309
Army Commendation Medal	-	68
Purple Heart	-	80
Army Commendation Medal "V"	-	17
Air Medal "V"	-	6
Combat Infantryman's Badge	-	230
Combat Medical Badge	-	7

f. Turn over of Personnel: The 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) experienced a personnel turnover of approximately 25%.

g. R & R: An improved system was instituted giving allocations directly to "C" detachments. A total of 148 personnel went on R & R in August; 159 in September and 134 in October.

8. (C) Medical:

a. A 40 bed CIDG treatment hospital has been recently completed at Pleiku. This facility will be jointly staffed by USASF and VNSE. This hospital will provide capability for medical and surgical care to CIDG and their dependents to include most major surgical procedures.

b. English-Vietnamese Language Tapes - This language phrase tape prepared by the 5th SFGA Surgeons Section has been distributed to all detachments. This tape is to be used by USASF medical personnel to aid in eliciting a history from civilian and CIDG personnel--providing for better patient-medic relations and better treatment.

c. Medical Civic Action - Outpatient treatment figures reached a high in August 1966 with 127,231 patients treated. Figures for September are 117,023. October treatment figures are 116,115.

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d. The Special Forces Village Health Workers Course has been approved by the GVN Ministry of Health to be taught by Special Forces personnel. USAID, MILPHAP, Province Chiefs and Medical Chiefs, and USOM have participated in these training programs. To date two courses - 11 students each - have been completed in I CTZ - 26 students are presently enrolled at Detachment C-4.

e. Four two man training teams arrived in RVN on 10 September. They are presently deployed at training CIDG medics and instructing in the Village Health Workers Course in each Corps area. To date these teams have completed the following:

C-1: 11 students - Village Health Workers Course. 22 students CIDG basic medic course.

C-2: Two CIDG basic medic courses - 40 students. 40 students presently enrolled in a basic CIDG medic course.

C-3: 26 students in CIDG basic medic school. 26 students in Hamlet Health Workers School - began 9 October 1966.

C-4: 48 students have completed the basic CIDG medic course. 22 and 26 each class - II classes. Hamlet Health Worker Course in progress with 26 students.

f. The U.S. Army Special Forces (Airborne), Walter Reed Institute of Research Survey Team has recently arrived in RVN. This group is attached to the 5th SFGA. This survey team is in the process of doing research on diseases of military medical importance in RVN. Personnel will be based at remote area "A" detachments to run disease surveys in these areas.

g. The medical supply warehouse and system has been reorganized. An inventory was conducted and new improved shipping procedures have been instituted. We have experienced a very high incidence of pilferage of medical supply items during shipment process.

9. (C) Signal:

a. Communications Traffic:

(1) Total traffic count has continued to increase during this reporting period for a total of 8,349 messages handled by the SFOB comm center. The comm centers at subordinate headquarters handled an average of 3,069 messages. The traffic count has been steadily increasing each month and can be expected to rise even more when all point-to-point long line teletype circuits become operational. At present, difficulties are being experienced with the speed in which the traffic can be handled over the current radio teletype circuits.

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(2) To solve this problem, a request was made for six long line point-to-point circuits between this headquarters and subordinate units over the fixed troposcatter system. An approval for the circuits has been granted, but installation and activation of the circuits are pending availability of channels on the tropo-system.

b. Base Radio Communication System AN/TSC-26(U):

(1) Information has reached this headquarters that the AN/TSC-26 will be shipped to the 5th SFG (Abn) in the near future. The arrival date in RVN is unknown at present. The big problem we are now facing is obtaining qualified personnel to man this gear. An intensified training program for assigned Special Forces communications personnel will be required before the equipment can be put into use. Another major problem encountered is the frequency authorization. The rated power out-put of the AN/TSC-26 is 2,500 watts and special authorization for frequencies is required.

(2) Training of communications personnel can be accomplished within the 5th SFG (Abn). However, to expedite the training and the eventual commitment of the AN/TSC-26 into operations, 2,500 watt frequencies must be authorized. A request to MACV-J6 has been initiated.

c. AN/PRC-74 Radio Set:

(1) The AN/PRC-74 radio set is used for portable long-range field communications. It is considered an excellent radio except for the weight and size. The use of the originally designed dry battery pack is too heavy for long-range patrols and requires seventy each BA-30 batteries. When a number of batteries go bad, all batteries must be replaced due to having no means available in the field to check them. This involves carrying a large supply of batteries.

(2) A study was made by the electronics maintenance personnel of this headquarters to determine what improvements could be made. As a result, a new lightweight rechargeable nickel-cadmium battery pack has been locally designed and developed for the AN/PRC-74 Radio Set. At present, two sets are undergoing field tests and the preliminary reports are satisfactory. (See Incl #8).

10. (C) Engineer:

a. On 22 August 1966 three five man engineer KB teams arrived from 539th Engineer Detachment, 1st SFG (Abn), 1st SF on Okinawa. These teams replaced four KB teams which returned to Okinawa on 24 August upon completing their six month TDY tours.

b. The mission of these engineer KB teams was to assist in new CIDG camp construction. This assistance was in the form of construction equipment

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support, technical advice, and construction supervisory skills. Also, a three man KA team arrived in country to provide the control element for the KB teams. In addition, the KA team leader became the acting Group Engineer.

c. During the months of August, September, and October the KB teams worked on five new CIDG camps. Duc Phong and Trai Bi camps were completed and work continues at Dak Seang, Duc Lap, and Loc Ninh.

11. (S) CIDG Finance:

a. On 1 August 1966, the official piastre conversion rate was changed from 79.2\$VN to \$1.00 US to a new rate of 80.0\$VN to \$1.00US. This change represented a currency devaluation and resulted in a paper loss to CIDG Finance of \$57,135.74. One advantage of the new rate is that currency conversion is much simpler now.

b. On 20 August 1966, personnel from CIDG Finance began making audit/assistance visits to all Special Forces detachment Funds Officers. The purpose of these visits is to make on-site audits of Funds Officers records and to render assistance when needed. The plan is to visit all Special Forces detachments on a six month cycle basis. A total of 40 detachments have been audited to date. Detailed reports of these inspections are maintained on file in the CIDG Finance Office. The audits thus far have proven mutually advantageous to the command and to the respective detachments. Detailed financial problems have been resolved on the spot and CIDG Finance personnel have gained valuable information on a first hand basis to use for programming and budgeting purposes.

c. An audit team from CAS Okinawa made a detailed inspection of CIDG Finance records and procedures on 30 and 31 August 1966. The auditors noted the many improvements that had been made since the last audit in October 1965 and were satisfied with the accounting procedures and fund controls presently in effect.

d. The FY 1967 Budget and the FY 1968 Command Budget Estimates have been revised and will be submitted thru MACV to USARPAC on 2 November 1966. These budget revisions were necessitated by the extensive organizational changes within 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) and the new Concept of Operations for CY 1967. Current FY 1967 and FY 1968 requirements are as follows:

	<u>FY 1967</u>	<u>FY 1968</u>
In-Country O&MA	\$ 45,498,000	\$ 54,990,000
Oct-of-Country		
O&MA	\$ 21,125,000	\$ 22,951,000
PEMA	\$ 31,210,000	\$ 31,911,000
	\$ 97,833,000	\$109,852,000

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12. (C) Comptroller:

a. On 5 July 1966 the Office of the Comptroller was established as a principal staff section in the command. The CIDG Finance Section was placed under the supervision of the Comptroller. Previously the CIDG Finance Office had been the action agency for monitoring costs and processing requests for expenditures of funds. This was found to be an undesirable situation in that the office was swamped with day to day accounting work and finance personnel, understandably, were not familiar with the special type requirements for funds often necessary in an organization such as this. The comptroller section was staffed with personnel, both officers and enlisted, who have previous experience in Special Forces and with Special Forces in Vietnam.

b. Activities in the section have included the publication of an Administration and Functions Manual (Incl #34) to insure standardization of correspondence and to outline responsibilities within each staff section. A joint directive was published, establishing for the first time, a standard leave, AWOL, and hospitalization policy for CIDG personnel. Previous to this each detachment had some type of local SOP that often provided only the most minimum explanation and control. Several discrepancies in financial administration were corrected. These included unauthorized payment of bonuses to VNSF personnel working with special projects in the command. The VNSF is a MAP funded organization and the funds available to the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), cannot be used to support them in any way.

c. A pilot program for centralized finding at the "C" detachment level proved successful in I CTZ. Primary purpose of the program is to relieve the subordinate "A" detachments of the administrative burden of keeping pay cards and preparing payrolls each month. It also provides for closer monitoring of expenditures by higher headquarters. The program is scheduled to go into effect in all CTZ's on 1 November 1966.

d. A reduction in the number of civilians employed by the command and the standardization of wage scales has been effected. Continuous monitoring of the level of civilian employees continues. In many cases personnel such as carpenters or electricians were permanent employees only so they would be available when required.

e. Budgetary savings allowed for the development of new incentive pay scales for CIDG personnel in the more hazardous duties. Extra combat pay is now authorized for personnel who are members of a Combat Reconnaissance Platoon. Savings also have allowed the payment of parachute proficiency pay to those special indigenous personnel whose duties require them to perform parachute jumps.

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f. A review of death gratuity benefits paid by the CIDG program reveals that benefits were insufficient as compared to benefits paid to Regional Force and Popular Force personnel. Sufficient funds were not available to immediately align the scale with those of the RF/PF program. It was determined that an additional 2000\$VN in death benefits would be paid to survivors of CIDG personnel. 2000\$VN being the average price for a burial in Vietnam. Sufficient funds were budgeted in the revised FY67 budget to allow equalization of the death gratuity scales.

g. Operational changes and increased operational requirements made it necessary to revise the FY 1967 budget and the FY 1968 budget estimate. In October a liaison trip was made to the Counterinsurgency Support Office (CISO) on Okinawa to revise the out-of-country portion of the budget. This close liaison with CISO has assisted in the development of realistic requirement levels and better understanding by CISO of the present and future operational plans of the command.

h. In-country changes to the budget included an increase in Combat Pay for the combat reconnaissance personnel, and increase in the wage scale for civilian employees, and it also anticipated a rise in subsistence costs throughout the country. Other increases were due to increased personnel requirements made necessary by operational commitments.

i. Several years ago when the VNSF was placed in command of the CIDG program, they were experiencing a shortage of radio operators. An agreement was made at that time to substitute civilian operator for military operators until sufficient military operators could be trained. The agreement was made because of operational necessity not only to keep the VNSF operational but to provide a back up for Special Forces communications if required. Since neither the VNSF nor the MAP program could provide funding in support of these civilians, it was agreed that Switchback funds would be used to pay them. A study by the Comptroller revealed that the number of civilian radio operators has increased rather than decreased, despite the training of military operators by USASF. It is granted that increased operational commitments have required additional radio operators, however, the study revealed that in many areas, especially at VNSF "B" and "C" detachment levels, there was an overage in radio operators. Additionally the VNSF was slow in providing personnel to the communications school for training. The VNSF has now agreed to begin a positive program of elimination of the civilian radio operators. The VNSF has agreed to provide sufficient input into the communications school to accelerate replacement of the civilian radio operators.

j. One of the unforecasted expenditures made during the quarter was associated with the attachment of the 281st Aviation Company to the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne). This unit arrived with no prior provision

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for billets nor a suitable area for aircraft parking and maintenance facilities. In the interest of operational necessity, a substantial amount of money was spent to build a hard stand for helicopters, a maintenance facility, troop billets and unit orderly room and supply room. Funds expended have been included in the revised FY 1967 budget.

k. The Comptroller has initiated two reports during this quarter. The first is a monthly survey submitted by all principal and special staff section, HHC and Signal Company. The report is intended to reflect those changes in administration and operational techniques that improve the efficiency of the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne).

l. The second report is a monthly statistical summary. Primarily, this summary is to provide the Commander with a quick reference list of statistical subjects ranging from theater attendance to critical shortages of supply items. The summary is distributed to subordinate commands to provide them with a means for comparing their activities with other subordinate commands within the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne).

SECTION 2 (C) COMMANDERS' OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

PART I - Observations (Lessons Learned)

1. (U) Personnel: None.

2. (C) Operations:

a. ITEM: Reinforcement of Camp Khe Sanh (Source: Det C-1)

DISCUSSION: The CG, III MAF ordered the 3rd Marine Division to reinforce Khe Sanh with one battalion of Marines, whose mission was to provide security to the camp out to a range of 6,000 meters (120mm mortar range). On 30 September the 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines (1/3 Mar) reinforced with 2 Marine 155mm howitzers and 3 105mm howitzers arrived at Khe Sanh. Detachment B-52 (Project DELTA) began reconnaissance operations in and near the Khe Sanh TAOB in October, operating under the OPCON of the CG, I Corps. Since the reinforcement of Khe Sanh was accomplished, the possibility of a heavy enemy attack has lessened. Also, although the 1/3 Mar were present only for security purposes, their presence enabled the CIDG to conduct more numerous operations of longer range and duration.

OBSERVATION: Timely reinforcement of Khe Sanh appears to have frustrated enemy plans to attack the camp and/or draw reinforcing relief columns into a trap. Presence of Marine reinforcements to secure the camp permitted long range and numerous CIDG offensive operations. Reinforcements with long range artillery enabled CIDG patrols to operate at increased distances

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3/ while enjoying artillery fire support. Reinforcement with a reconnaissance unit provided increased security to the district by extending the capability of reconnaissance and surveillance.

b. ITEM: Coordination between units and forces (Source: Det C-1) around Camp Khe Sanh.

DISCUSSION: Within the Khe Sanh TAOR there are the following units or organizations operating under the command of the individuals indicated:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>SIZE</u>	<u>COMMAND</u>
USASF Det A-101	A Det	USASF A Det CO
VNSF Det A-101	A Det	VNSF A Det CO
CIDG	3 Co's, 1 CRP	VNSF A Det CO
RF	1 Co	District Chief
PF	447 Pers	District Chief
PAT	1 Co	District Chief
ARVN 4/2 Regt	1 Bn	ARVN Bn CO
USMC 1/3 Mar	1 Bn	USMC Bn CO
SOG Det	unk	SOG Det CO
Tiger Hound Det	unk	Tiger Hound Det CO

In addition to these forces, across the border in Laos, adjacent to the Khe Sanh TAOR, is the Royal Lao 33rd Battalion, which is a friendly force. Within the Khe Sanh district there are 4 ARVN 105mm howitzers, 3 USMC 105mm howitzers, and 2 USMC 155mm howitzers. These forces do not operate under the command or OPCON of a single individual. Unity of command is totally lacking. The only unification existant is the CIC, under the control of the USASF A Detachment Commander, and a cooperative artillery fire control center under the USMC.

OBSERVATION: Lack of a single task force commander because each unit desires to retain autonomy defies the basic principle of unity of command. A task force commander with a control headquarters could better control and coordinate all operations and actions. Political considerations in this particular case override tactical considerations, which could prove to be to the detriment of accomplishing assigned missions.

c. ITEM: Use of ARVN Scout Dogs (Source: Det C-1)

DISCUSSION: Camp Tien Phuoc employed 6 ARVN handlers and scout dogs on 1 operation in October. The dogs and handlers were not capable of meeting the physical demands of long range patrolling. Terrain covered was

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rice paddies, dikes, and brush covered low hills. Weather was fair. ARVN handlers also refused to take point and work their dogs properly. 32

OBSERVATION: ARVN dogs and handlers are of little value on long range patrol operations in I Corps Tactical Zone.

d. ITEM: Night Combat Assault Landing (Source: Det A-104, Ha Thanh)

DISCUSSION: On the night of 12 September, 1 company of Mike Force personnel reinforced Camp Ha Thanh by conducting a night combat assault landing by OV-2 aircraft. Illumination for the landing was provided by flareship.

OBSERVATION: This technique of landing, using illumination provided by flareships, was highly successful and caught the enemy completely by surprise.

e. ITEM: Alternate Firing Positions for Camp Mortars (Source: Det A-104)

DISCUSSION: The enemy knew in advance the location of the camp's mortars, which enabled him to place accurate recoilless rifle fire on those positions. The results were that the 4.2 in mortar was destroyed and several men killed and wounded.

OBSERVATION: Alternate firing positions for mortars should be prepared and the mortars should be frequently moved to different positions. Considerations should be given to the emplacement of dummy mortars in unoccupied positions.

f. ITEM: A1E Skyraiders for Resupply Missions (Source: Det C-1)

DISCUSSION: Leaflet containers can be used for free dropping supplies to long range patrols. The A1E tactical fighter bomber-aircraft is capable of carrying 11 leaflet containers that can be filled with patrol supplies. In the absence of panels or signal lights on a DZ, the tactical aircraft can drop with a high degree of accuracy on any distinguishable terrain feature. Communications between the patrol and the A1E aircraft can be facilitated by the FM capability of the aircraft.

OBSERVATION: A1E aircraft can provide an accurate and effective means of freedropping supplies to long range patrols. The aircraft is capable of providing undetected daylight resupply to troops behind enemy lines, as the aircraft is not normally associated with air resupply type missions.

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g. ITEM: Waterborne Operations

(Source: Det C-4)

DISCUSSION: On 16 October, a joint waterborne operation was conducted by Detachments A-414 and A-416, utilizing 26 plastic assault boats and 6 US Navy ~~PER~~ boats. The operation was supported by 2 sections of gunships and 1 command and control helicopter. High flood waters throughout the area had forced the Viet Cong to move their caches to higher grounds, leaving them vulnerable to friendly initiated combat operations. The high water level also reduced the effectiveness of VC mines and booby traps; restricted the VC's mobility to sampans and forced him to contend with effects of the flood, thereby reducing his alertness to attack. The results of this operation are discussed in inclosure #27.

OBSERVATION: This operation was highly successful for the following reasons:

(1) USASF/VNSF/CIDG flexibility in reacting to contact at an unexpected time and place with rapidity and aggressiveness.

(2) The fire superiority provided by the large number of crew served weapon employed on waterborne operations.

(3) Superior mobility of the friendly force.

(4) Viet Cong vulnerability to attack during flooded conditions.

3. (U) Training and Organization:a. ITEM: Waterborne Unit Organization

(Source: Det C-4)

DISCUSSION: If USASF/VNSF do not have CIDG companies organized into boat crews, confusion occurs during the embarking and debarking and unit integrity is lost.

OBSERVATION: CIDG companies organized into boat crews and trained in boat operations obtained better results. Platoons and squads equipped with sampans with 6 hp motors can be effectively used as a quick reaction force.

b. ITEM: Waterborne Tactics

(Source: Det C-4)

DISCUSSION: CIDG units are unfamiliar with boat tactics at the beginning of each rainy season. This causes unnecessary casualties and delay in gaining the advantage over the Viet Cong.

OBSERVATION: Units that receive boat tactics at the base camp prior to operations achieve better results.

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c. ITEM: Small Unit Tactics

(Source: Det C-4)

DISCUSSION: CIDG units contact the enemy unexpectedly. Some of their leaders become confused mainly as a result of their inability to handle the situation.

OBSERVATION. Units that have received training at Dong Ba Thin Training Center are sufficiently trained in small unit tactics, and react quickly and effectively in an engagement.

4. (C) Intelligence:a. ITEM: Increased Intelligence Collection and Production. (Source: Group S-2)

DISCUSSION: The demand for sound and timely intelligence will continue to expand and will tend to become more sophisticated as the problem of locating the enemy becomes more difficult. With the increase of intelligence agencies in RVN the value of coordinating and reporting timely intelligence becomes more apparent.

OBSERVATION: To insure that detachments of the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) receive sound and timely intelligence, Intelligence Analysis Centers have been organized at the "C" detachment level. Furthermore, as the enemy threat increased in the vicinity of specific Special Forces camps, Combined Intelligence Centers were organized at these "A" camps to collate all intelligence gathered in the vicinity of the camp by various sources for the purpose of providing timely intelligence to that specific "A" detachment commander. These two organizations are discussed in inclosures #19 and #16 respectively.

b. ITEM: Consolidation of Intelligence Nets (Source: Group S-2)

DISCUSSION: With the present emphasis placed on collection nets and source control, "A" detachment Intelligence Sergeants are required to spend much of their time on the administration of these programs. However a noticeable fact in the field is that much of the Intelligence Sergeant's time is not and cannot be spent on sophisticated intelligence collection nets.

OBSERVATION: Considerations and proposals for comment have been forwarded to subordinate detachments (reference Incl #17).

c. ITEM: Weather Observations and Reporting at (Source: Group S-2)
specific locations within RVN.

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DISCUSSION: Due to the lack of personnel required to establish additional weather observing stations, adequate weather observations were not available to combat and support units in the vicinity of specific "A" detachment camps. The weather would have a definite and decisive influence on military operations conducted by and/or for the Special Forces detachment. Such was the case during the Ashau battle and the problems encountered by the US Air Force in support of the camp.

OBSERVATION: To provide for adequate weather observations and reporting, the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) and the 1st Weather Group (USAF) drafted a Special Forces Weather Observation Program (Incl #18). The results will be valuable to combat and support elements should they be called upon to aid in the defense of a camp, conduct joint operations, or provide aerial resupply.

c. ITEM: Handling, Processing and Exploitation (Source: Group S-2) of Captives, Returnees, Suspects, Documents and Materiel.

DISCUSSION: "A" detachments in the field have not received the benefits of timely information from captives and captured documents because they were required to place emphasis on the almost immediate movement of these to ARVN or next higher US channels.

OBSERVATION: The 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) is publishing appropriate regulations outlining guidance and procedures so that all friendly elements will receive maximum timely information and intelligence. The regulations allow maximum use and exploitation of captives, returnees and captured documents by USASF detachments within the purview of current MACV directives and regulations. An item of interest is that the regulation states that captives will be evacuated when they are no longer considered to be of intelligence value. This allows the detachment commanders to emphasize tactical exploitation rather than evacuation.

d. ITEM: Issue of HT-1 Radios to Agents (Source: Det A-101, Khe Sanh)

DISCUSSION: MACV issued 20 HT-1 radios to Detachment A-101 for subsequent issue to indigenous agents throughout and near the Khe Sanh TAOR. The purpose of the radios was to increase the rapidity of intelligence reports and to provide an early warning system to the district. However, agents were not receptive to receiving and using the radios. Only six were actually issued. The primary problem is that the radio is rather large, difficult to hide or conceal, and subsequently places an agent in fear of being discovered by the enemy. Another observation is that to be effective, there must be several frequencies, to prevent the entire net from being compromised by loss of an agent and radio. Detachment A-101 returned some HT-1's for crystal frequency changes. A final observation is that the base station must be capable of monitoring the different frequencies assigned, and the base must operate continuously.

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OBSERVATION: A smaller, more compact radio than the HT-1 should be issued to agents both to allay their psychological fear as well as to give a physical means of reducing the probability of compromise of the agent. Several frequencies are required for security of the intelligence net, and a base receiving station capable of continuous monitoring on all channels is required.

e. ITEM: Radar Set AN/PPS-5

(Source: Det C-4)

DISCUSSION: Employment of the radar set in the IV Corps area during the rainy season is ineffective. Water causes a reflection of the signal producing distortion and a false read out. Most detachments are surrounded by water for 8 months out of the year.

OBSERVATION: A more effective surveillance instrument should be programmed for the IV Corps area in lieu of the AN/PPS-5. Probably a more effective device because of the flat open terrain would be the star-light scope, large.

f. ITEM: Establishment of a Combined Intelligence Center (CIC).

(Source: Det C-1)

DISCUSSION: COMUSMACV directed a CIC be established to enable an increased intelligence collection, coordination and analysis capability. The Detachment A-101 Commander was directed to head it. All organizations and agencies operating in the area were directed to feed intelligence information to the CIC. Personnel assignments made to the CIC were a director, an intelligence sergeant, an intelligence specialist, a clerk, a USMC interrogation team, and interpreters. A liaison team from the 3d Marine Division was attached. An RMT was installed at Khe Sanh to expedite the flow of intelligence back to Detachment C-1. The CIC submits a daily intelligence summary.

OBSERVATION: The CIC has unified collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence being generated and assures dissemination of intelligence in the Khe Sanh area. It permits more accurate intelligence being generated and assures dissemination to all units and agencies which have a requirement for the intelligence.

5. (U) Logistics:

a. ITEM: Breakage of Rice Bags when Air Dropped (Source: Group S-4)

DISCUSSION: Previously, the Logistical Support Center was experiencing an extremely high rate of breakage of rice bags when delivered by air drop. In order to eliminate this problem the following method of rigging has been utilized: First step is to place the 50 kilo bag of rice inside a

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100 kilo rice bag and secure with twine. Secondly place 2 heavy duty cardboard boxes on the delivery pallet and load each box with 5 bags of rice and secure with A-7A straps. Attach 3 cargo parachutes to the load and it is ready for air drop.

OBSERVATION: Since utilizing this method we have received no complaints concerning loss of rice due to breakage. Attached photo shows the finished product prepared for air drop.



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
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b. ITEM: Air Delivery of Livestock

(Source: Group S-4)

DISCUSSION: When air dropping livestock, previously used containers were disintegrating, thus releasing the livestock and allowing them to free fall resulting in a complete loss of the cattle. To overcome this problem a modified sling consisting of 4 A-7A straps sewn to a heavy rice bag is constructed. After securing the cow in the harness, place it in the crate and attach the remainder of the A-7A straps with the sling harness directly to the main D rings. Attach 3 G-13 cargo parachutes and the load is ready for delivery.

OBSERVATION: Since adopting this method of delivery, no livestock have been subject to free fall. Attached photographs outline the rigging procedures used.



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
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c. ITEM: Resurfacing of Khe Sanh Airstrip (Source: Det C-1)
with Aluminum Planking.

DISCUSSION: The airstrip at Khe Sanh was a badly deteriorated pierced steel planking (PSP) with an intended C-130 capability. The PSP had so deteriorated that it presented hazardous obstacles to aircraft. A Seabee team, working around the clock, removed the old PSP and resurfaced the strip with noncorroding aluminum sheet planking in 5 days. Without the improvement of the airstrip, the large increase in air traffic necessary to sustain the increased troop strength in the area would not have been possible.

OBSERVATION: The new aluminum planking now available for surfacing airstrips can be laid rapidly by skilled engineers, and the aluminum planking has an all weather capability and a long durability. Every effort should be made to surface Special Forces airstrips with aluminum planking.

6. (C) Other:

a. ITEM: Establishment of Comptroller Section (Source: Gp Compt)

DISCUSSION: The abundance of accounting transactions by CIDG finance made it extremely difficult for that office to closely monitor and evaluate expenditures in the command.

OBSERVATION: Establishment of the Comptroller Section has allowed a separate monitoring agency to analyse and evaluate expenditures.

b. ITEM: Administration and Functions Manual (Source: Gp Compt)

DISCUSSION: To replace several Group regulations and command letters governing administrative procedures, one principal source was required. In addition, a document was required explaining organization of the command and a narrative of job responsibilities for principal and special staff sections.

OBSERVATION: The publication of the Administrative and Functions Manual has standardized administrative procedures throughout the command and assisted in better understanding of job positions and staff responsibilities.

c. ITEM: CIDG Leave, AWOL and Hospitalization (Source: Gp Compt)
Policy.

DISCUSSION: Since there was no standard policy for leave, AWOL or hospitalization for the CIDG program, much confusion existed as to how much leave a CIDG soldier was authorized, what constituted an AWOL and how

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long a man is carried on the payroll after he has been hospitalized. Many local SOP's were developed by subordinate commanders but there were many instances of misunderstanding and mismanagement.

OBSERVATION: Publication of the CIDG leave, AWOL and hospitalization policy has established a firm standard for the command and eliminated confusion and misunderstanding.

d. ITEM: Centralized Funding System (Source: Gp Compt)

DISCUSSION: A pilot program of centralized funding in I Corps proved successful. It eliminated the requirement for preparation of payrolls, maintenance of pay cards, paying of contractors and civilian laborers plus keeping volumes of records of expenditures at the "A" detachment level. A favorable side effect was revealed in that money was saved by centralized purchase of foodstuffs and materials in larger units. The system also allowed a standardization of pay procedures and close monitoring of expenditures by a higher headquarters. The primary purpose was to eliminate the administrative burden in the "A" detachments.

OBSERVATION: The centralized funding system will go into effect in all Corps Tactical Zones on 1 November 1966.

e. ITEM: Responsive Airlift System (Source: Gp Avn Off)

DISCUSSION: The 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) operates a supply system which is separate from the normal Army supply system. Procurement, accounting, storage, and supply delivery are all designed to support this quick reaction system. The supply distribution responsibility of Special Forces in Vietnam is approximately equivalent to that found in a US Army separate Corps. Virtually all supplies must go by aircraft because of the generally insecure areas in which Special Forces camps are habitually located. Twenty of the 66 camps with airfields are capable of air landing CV-2B resupply aircraft only. The existing ground commanders operational control of the CV-2B aircraft provides a system with 24 hours or less response time to routine missions. Additionally, the present operational system of the CV-2B can provide emergency response in 1 hour or less if a camp is attacked.

OBSERVATION: A portion of the airlift must be provided in a system, such as exists now, which will be responsive to the Commander, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), from preparation to delivery. The present system with the CV-2B under the operational control of the ground commander provides that required responsive system needed by Special Forces to perform its assigned mission.

f. ITEM: Hamlet Health Visitor's Program (Source: Gp S-5)

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DISCUSSION: The success of this program depends greatly on the training aids and facilities obtained, and the follow-up and inspection of Phase II Training. It is imperative that the HHV be placed in the Provincial budget and that each HHV is paid regularly.

OBSERVATION: JUSPAO and USAID can be effectively used to provide the training aids and to follow-up on the budgeting of the HHV.

g. ITEM: Agricultural Program (Source: Gp S-5)

DISCUSSION: Cattle, fish and seed may be obtained through the Ministry of Agriculture for local programs.

OBSERVATION: Coordination must be made at National level to obtain cattle. In the future such requests will be coordinated with Asst S-5 in Saigon in order that he may obtain them through the Minister of Agriculture.

h. ITEM: Refugees (Source: Gp S-5)

DISCUSSION: To handle emergency influxes of refugees, a pre-packaged kit containing essential relief supplies is required to ease the supply commitments of the detachment affected.

OBSERVATION: An "Alpha" kit is located at SFOB for this purpose, but additional longer term aid must be obtained through USAID and GVN to sustain the refugees.

i. ITEM: Elections (Source: Gp S-5)

DISCUSSION: VIS personnel organized rallies, meetings, conferences and orientation sessions and used all available media to reach every potential voter.

OBSERVATION: USASF personnel must not become involved with candidates but must be available for advice and should supply on request loud-speakers, tape recorders and other public address devices.

j. ITEM: CIDG CA/PO Teams (Source: Gp S-5)

DISCUSSION: These teams have become well known and provide invaluable assistance in medical and civic action programs.

OBSERVATION: Special identification devices, i.e., scarves etc., should be utilized to give these teams a sense of identity and pride. Selection of personnel for these teams should remain limited to the highly motivated, dynamic, and trained person.

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k. ITEM: Newspapers

(Source: Gp S-5)

DISCUSSION: Vietnamese language newspapers presenting national and local interest news, as well as motivation articles are well accepted by the population.

OBSERVATION: Common dialects as well as VN language papers are read avidly, and in areas of low literacy those who can read pass the word to the illiterate. This device has an unlimited PSYOP potential.

1. ITEM: Enlisted Medical Personnel

(Source: Gp Surg)

DISCUSSION: Many detachments are short medics. There is a critical shortage of Special Forces trained medics Army-wide. Many replacement medics are completely without experience and only partially trained. This situation shows little sign of improvement during the next 6 months.

OBSERVATION: Each medic coming to 5th SFGA should be interviewed by the Group Surgeon and a recommendation as to his assignment be made, based upon his training, experience, rank, and the detachments with the greatest need for replacements.

m. ITEM: Indigenous troops recruited from (Source: Gp Surg)
certain areas of II CTZ are carrying strains of malaria resistant to chloroquine.

DISCUSSION: For these personnel the weekly chloroquine prophylaxis is inadequate. They constitute a reservoir of a potentially dangerous disease located in proximity to USASF personnel. When committed to field operations in excess of 10 days duration many of these troops will become combat ineffective due to development of clinical malaria.

OBSERVATION: Mike Force personnel at Detachments C-1, C-2 and B-50 should be screened by the WRAIR - USASF Medical Research Team to find the malaria carriers. Curative therapy should be undertaken. Malaria discipline must be stressed at all times. Chloroquine and Dapsone prophylaxis should be instituted where indicated. Efforts should be increased to provide something more substantial than the usual indigenous rations for those troops at least every 7 days to prevent the malaria outbreaks coincident to a lowered nutritional state and physical stress.

n. ITEM: Airboats

(Source: Gp S-3)

DISCUSSION: Twenty-two airboats were received during October. A change in priority which necessitated programming of the airboats into the C-141 traffic schedule delayed their arrival. Once in-country, transportation

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again was a problem. Airboats cannot be carried by CH-47 aircraft in the shipping configuration so LST's were used to move the boats from Saigon to Can Tho. Three weeks of training were given to the drivers and mechanics. Upon pre-service checkout and testing, three tachometer cables and one magneto failed. The parts, except for the magneto, were replaced through Air Force channels.

OBSERVATION: There appears to be a problem on repair parts availability. The original contract was amended to add spare parts and tools but these items have yet to arrive. Detachment C-4 has instituted satisfactory controls on the airboats to insure proper utilization. Once training has been completed, the airboats will be used in platoon elements of six boats and attached for operations to the "A" detachments which need them. Maintenance facilities will be located at "B" and "C" detachment levels.

o. ITEM: AN/PPS-5 Radar Sets

(Source: Gp S-3)

DISCUSSION: The 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) has three AN/PPS-5's. These sets have been deployed at the "A" detachment level since their receipt. The original set with a 120° sweep has been modified by an attachment which gives the capability of a 360° sweep. The sets have the same problems as all other radars in that continual maintenance is necessary to keep them operational. Replacement parts are not plentiful at this time thus causing some delay in repairs when a set breaks down. The personnel to man the sets must be trained and allocated from Signal Company, 5th SFG resources until the MTOE authorizing additional personnel is approved. These sets are shifted as the threats in a given area increase and decrease.

OBSERVATION: These sets have proven to be extremely valuable in assisting the curtailment of VC movement in the vicinity of camps which have them. The sets have been rotated to new areas on an average of once each two months. The operators are proficient after about ten hours on the set. The sets are down for maintenance approximately 1/5th of the time.

p. ITEM: Night Observation Devices

(Source: Gp S-3)

DISCUSSION: 5th SFGA has 25 starlight scopes, 24 short range and one medium range. These items have been distributed to the "A" detachments for use on offensive operations and ambushes. The adjustment knobs on the short range scope wear out rather rapidly and thus the replacement of these is necessary. The medium range MOD is a great asset to a Special Forces camp because the device destroys the enemy's capability of moving undetected into proximity of the camp under cover of darkness.

OBSERVATION: It would be a tremendous asset if these items could be issued to each camp in Vietnam.

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- q. ITEM: Long Shaft Motors (Source: Det C-4)

DISCUSSION: A study was made by Detachment C-4 concerning the use of long shaft motors to provide the power source for moving personnel and supplies via plastic assault boats and small sampans in the delta region of Vietnam. Two Briggs and Stratton engines are coupled directly to shafts 10' in length driving 6" propellers. The savings in manpower and time over moving those items by paddle coupled with the ease of obtaining spare parts off of the local economy makes a favorable situation.

OBSERVATION: The project was not given favorable action because a survey test conducted by ACTIV in July 1965 listed too many disadvantages namely: No way to turn a long shaft powered boat except by stopping the engines and turning by paddle; long shafts are much slower than outboard motors; long shaft designs foul in reeds and rice paddies in shorter distances than outboard motors; and finally because outboard motors are on hand and the Briggs and Stratton engines would have to be purchased.

- r. ITEM: Chemiluminescent Panels (Source: Gp S-3)

DISCUSSION: ACTIV gave sixteen panels to 5th SFGA for test and evaluation. These items were broken down among the special mission units of this organization. They were used by both reconnaissance and combat small unit patrols and by personnel on operations to mark resupply drop zones. The panels worked well except for a couple of factors. They cannot be turned off except by burying them when the need for illuminated markers has passed. They do not function properly when wet.

OBSERVATION: Any mission on which a Chemiluminescent Panel would be used can be accomplished with a G.I. flashlight with appropriate lens covers.

- s. ITEM: Site Marker Balloons (Source: Gp S-3)

DISCUSSION: Site Marker Balloons were given to the 5th SFG by ACTIV for test and evaluation. The Site Marker Balloons were used by reconnaissance patrols of the special missions teams of this organization. They were used for position fixes by aircraft to eliminate the excessive amount of traffic over the air when a ground team is given a fix by a FAC. The balloons worked very well, the gas bottles were fairly light and the balloons easy to fill and seal. The balloons could work their way through light and medium overhead canopy but could not get through heavy overhead jungle canopy.

OBSERVATION: Use of these balloons could be a great aid in certain terrain.

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PART II - Recommendations

1. (C) Signal.

a. Communications Traffic:

(1) Reference: Section 1, paragraph 9a.

(2) That action be taken to increase the number of long line Point-to-Point circuits to meet the expanding requirements throughout the RVN, enabling this headquarters to establish a fixed station teletype communications capability commensurate to its need.

b. Base Radio Communication System AN/TSC-26(U):

(1) Reference: Section 1, paragraph 9b.

(2) Recommend that a factory trained tech-rep Westrex Communications, New Rochelle, N.Y., be provided to the 5th SFG (Abn) to assist in the initial training of cadre personnel on the operations and maintenance of the AN/TSC-26 Radio Sets.

c. AN/PRC-74 Radio Set:

(1) Reference: Section 1, paragraph 9c and inclosure #8.

(2) Recommend that a representative from ECOM Labs be made aware of the development of the new light weight rechargeable nickel-cadmium battery pack and that action be initiated to have them manufactured and issued to Special Forces units in quantity equal to the number of AN/PRC-74 Radio Sets on hand.

2. (C) Intelligence: With the increase of various intelligence agencies in Vietnam it is becoming apparent that there is a definite need for a type of intelligence agency organized for the purpose of collating all intelligence gathered by these various agencies and making it immediately responsive to the needs of the local combat unit commanders. Organizations of this type are the "C" detachment IAC and "A" detachment CIC as previously discussed in this report. It is recommended that similar organizations be established within each Corps Tactical Zone so that all tactical units at every command level can be provided with timely intelligence from the many intelligence agencies within the Corps.

7
Incl

1. Troop Disposition List
2. Reaction to Intelligence Analysis

Francis J. Kelly
FRANCIS J. KELLY
Colonel, Armor
Commanding

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- ✓3. Camp Effectiveness Analysis (Cys 1-8 only)
 - ✓4. Project OMEGA Activation
 - ✓5. Project SIGMA Activation
 - ✓6. Project DELTA Reorganization
 - ✓7. MACV Recondo School (Cys 1-8 only)
 8. Nickel-Cadmium Battery for AN/PRC-74 (Cys 1-8 only) ✓
 9. "A" Detachment Camp Planning Handbook (Cys 1-8 only)
 10. "A" Detachment Handbook (Cys 1-8 only)
 11. Camp Hardening
 12. Visitor Briefings
 13. 21st Military History Detachment
 14. Green Beret Magazine (Cys 1-8 only)
 15. Order of the Green Scarf
 16. Combined Intelligence Center
 17. Consolidation of Intelligence Nets
 18. Special Forces Weather Observing Program (Cys 1-8 only)
 19. Information Analysis Center (Cys 1-8 only)
 20. Long Range Recon Force Concept
 21. Mobile Guerrilla Forces
 22. Viet Cong Casualties
 23. US Special Forces Casualties
 24. CIDG Casualties
 25. RF/PF Casualties
 26. Operations on Phu Quoc Island
 27. Joint Kinh Quan II and Moc Hoa Operation
 28. Project OMEGA After Action Report, Opn CLINTON (Cys 1-8 only)
 29. Minh Long Success Story
 30. Dak To Success Story
 31. Combined Forces Success Story
 32. Kinh Quan II Success Story
 33. Legal Handbook (Cys 1-8 only)
 34. Administration and Functions Manual (Cys 1- only)

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GROUP DISPOSITION LIST

REF	LOCATION	COORDINATES	PROVINCE/DISTRICT	CONTAINER	MISSION	ENTRY GROUPS
I CORPS						
C-1	DANANG	16075719	QUANG NAM/HOA VANG	LTC STEIN	CONTROL	NOTE
LMO	LAO TAI	35646734	QUANG NAM/CAI THANH	MAJ CAMPION	LAISCI	NOTE
A-101	KIE SAH	XD849419	QUANG NAM/HOANG HOA	CPT JEFFERSON	CIDG/SS/SS	VI, DNU
A-102	PHU PHUOC	3E107142	QUANG NAM/PHU PHUOC	CPT LARI	CIDG/SS	VI
A-103	QUA VUC	DS376270	QUANG NAM/PHUO	CPT JHONSON	CIDG	IRE, CUA
A-104	HA PHUO	DS390701	QUANG NAM/SON HA	CPT TESSOR	CIDG/SS	VI, IRE
A-105	KHANH JOC	Z3008081	QUANG NAM/PHUO DUC	CPT CUMBERDAIN	CIDG/SS	VI, IRE
A-106	BA TO	DS57323	QUANG NAM/BA TO	CPT BRUNER	CIDG/SS	VI, IRE
A-107	HA PHUO	DS344684	QUANG NAM/HA PHUO	CPT HONAN	CIDG/SS	VI, IRE
A-108	HA PHUO	DS356510	QUANG NAM/HA PHUO	CPT ENGLAND	CIDG/SS	VI, IRE
A-109	HA PHUO	Z3145553	QUANG NAM/HA PHUO	CPT STUBBS	CIDG/SS	VI
A-110	DANANG	DS075719	QUANG NAM/HOA VANG	CPT BANISTER	NOT DEPLOYED	NOTE
A-113	DANANG	DS075719	QUANG NAM/HOA VANG	CPT HARTZ	LIKE FORCE	READE, CATHES
II CORPS						
C-2	PHUO	AR765475	PHUO/HA PHUO	LTC PALATY	CONTROL	NOTE
A-219	PHUO	LS765475	PHUO/HA PHUO	CPT SLOTTRE	LIKE FORCE	READE
P-22	PHUO	GR088236	PHUO/HA PHUO	LTC JAMES	CONTROL	NOTE
A-221	QUA VUC	DS301435	PHUO/HA PHUO	CPT ALP	CIDG/SS	JACAT, VI
A-222	DOIG HET	DS307706	PHUO/HA PHUO	CPT JONES	CIDG/SS	READE, VI
A-223	YAM CAH	DS30060	PHUO/HA PHUO	CPT JONES	CIDG	DANANG, VI
A-224	PHUO	DS04598	PHUO/HA PHUO	CPT JONES	CIDG/SS	JACAT, DANANG

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DOI	LOCAL	COORDINATES	NOTICE/DISTANCE	COMMENTS	ASSIGN	FIELD GROUP
A-226	HAI LEM	142/5922	P 10 30 / P 11 15	CPT ZACARY	CIDG/SS	JARAI, BAKAR
A-227	DO 1 SC	14846947	11 15 / 12 15	CPT FOSK	CIDG	VI, BAKAR, HAI, JARAI, SEDANG
A-228	VIET NAM	14314605	11 15 / 12 15	CPT LANS	CIDG	VI, BAKAR
A-229	DO 1 SC	14314605	11 15 / 12 15	CPT LANS	CIDG	KONO
A-232	HAI LEM	143095873	11 15 / 12 15	CPT BAKAR	CIDG	KONO, VI
A-233	HAI LEM	143095873	11 15 / 12 15	CPT BAKAR	CIDG	READE, JARAI, LAO
A-234	HAI LEM	143095873	11 15 / 12 15	CPT BAKAR	CIDG	CRU, CILL, KONO
A-235	HAI LEM	143095873	11 15 / 12 15	CPT BAKAR	CIDG	VI, HONG, KONO, READE
A-236	HAI LEM	143095873	11 15 / 12 15	CPT BAKAR	CIDG	READE, JARAI
A-237	HAI LEM	143095873	11 15 / 12 15	CPT BAKAR	CIDG	CHAI
A-238	HAI LEM	143095873	11 15 / 12 15	CPT BAKAR	CIDG	READE
A-239	HAI LEM	143095873	11 15 / 12 15	CPT BAKAR	CIDG	READE, JARAI
A-240	HAI LEM	143095873	11 15 / 12 15	CPT BAKAR	CIDG	READE, JARAI
A-241	HAI LEM	143095873	11 15 / 12 15	CPT BAKAR	CIDG	READE, JARAI
A-242	HAI LEM	143095873	11 15 / 12 15	CPT BAKAR	CIDG	READE, JARAI
A-243	HAI LEM	143095873	11 15 / 12 15	CPT BAKAR	CIDG	READE, JARAI
A-244	HAI LEM	143095873	11 15 / 12 15	CPT BAKAR	CIDG	READE, JARAI
A-245	HAI LEM	143095873	11 15 / 12 15	CPT BAKAR	CIDG	READE, JARAI
A-253	HAI LEM	143095873	11 15 / 12 15	CPT BAKAR	CIDG	READE, JARAI
A-255	HAI LEM	143095873	11 15 / 12 15	CPT BAKAR	CIDG	READE, JARAI

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DEM	LOCAT	COCOD/NAME	PROV/CE/DISTRICT	COMMANDER	MISSION	ARMED GROUPS
III CORPS						
C-3	DIEM HOA	PT007123	DIEM HOA/DUC TU	LTC RUDDLESTON	CONTROL	VC, CAMBODIAN, CHINESE
A-301	TRANG STP	XT646555	TAY NINH/PHUOC NINH	CPT CARRY	CIDG/TS	CAMBODIAN, CHINESE
A-302	DIEM HOA	PT007124	DIEM HOA/DUC TU	CPT HENRIOT	MIKE FORCE	CHINESE, CAMBODIAN
C-31	YUAN LOC	XT461085	LONG KHANH/TAY PHONG	MAJ CRAWFORD	CONTROL/S/SS	VC, CAMBODIAN
A-311	YUAN LOC	XT929262	DIEM TU/THAN LITH	CPT GILBERT	CIDG	VC, CHAM
A-312	XOM CAN	XT154285	LONG KHANH/XUAN LOC	CPT NEAVES	CIDG	VC, CAMBODIAN
B-32	TAY NINH	XT205508	TAY NINH/PT PHUOC	LTC HAPPELSEY	CONTROL/S/SS	VC, CAMBODIAN
A-312	DIEM SOI	XT093475	TAY NINH/PHUOC NINH	CPT COX	CIDG/BS/SS	CAMBODIAN, VC
A-322	SOUT DA	XT339577	TAY NINH/PT PHUOC	CPT JOHNSON	CIDG	VC, CAMBODIAN
A-323	TRAI BI	XT112702	TAY NINH/PHUOC NINH	CPT PARKS	CIDG	VC, CAMBODIAN
A-324	SOUT DA LOC	XT231581	TAY NINH/PT PHUOC	CPT PERRY	RADIO RELAY	CAMBODIAN
A-325	DAO DO	XT438553	TAY NINH/KHUM LAM	CPT SCHOW	SS	VC
A-326	GO DAU LA	XT361252	TAY NINH/PT PHUOC	CPT TRICKETT	SS	VC
T-33	TAY NINH	XT756879	DIEM LONG/PT LOC	LTC BARNOR	CONTROL/S/SS	VC, CAMBODIAN
A-331	LOC TIT	XT725074	DIEM LONG/LOC TIT	CPT FICKS	CIDG/BS/SS	CAMBODIAN, LA MON
A-332	DIEM NINH	XT645670	DIEM LONG/CHAI THANH	CPT DUGES	CIDG	VC, CAMBODIAN
A-333	CHAI THANH	XT761614	DIEM LONG/CHAI THANH	CPT HOAT	CIDG/SS	VC, CAMBODIAN
B-34	SOUT DA	XT153081	PHUOC LONG/PHUOC BINH	LTC BENNETT	CONTROL/S/SS	VC, STERNG
A-431	BU DO	XT091629	PHUOC LONG/BO DO	CPT FRYWELL	CIDG/BS/SS	CAMBODIAN, VC
A-342	DAO KOL	XT091762	PHUOC LONG/DAO LUAN	CPT STEINBERG	CIDG/SS	CAMBODIAN, STERNG
A-343	DUC PHONG	XT436043	PHUOC LONG/DUC PHONG	CPT MULLER	CIDG	STERNG, CAMBODIAN
B-35	DIEM HOA	XT430072	TAY NINH/DUC TU	LTC OCHS	CONTROL/SS	VC, CAMBODIAN
A-351	DIEM HOA	XT430072	TAY NINH/DUC TU	CPT SHAW	NOT DEPLOYED	
A-352	DIEM HOA	XT430074	TAY NINH/DUC TU	CPT BRADY	NOT DEPLOYED	

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DEF	LOCATION	COORDINATES	MOVEMENT/DISTRICT	CC NUMBER	MISSION	ETHNIC GROUPS
A-353	TEMP. JOA	KT430072	HAU NGHIA/DUC HUE	HOUE	NOT DEPLOYED	
A-354	TEMP. JOA	KT430072	HAU NGHIA/DUC HUE	HOUE	NOT DEPLOYED	
B-55	SALUOI	(CIN)	GIA DIEN/CAP HIL DISC	HAU NGHIA	LAISSE	HAU NGHIA, CHINESE
D-56	HO NGOC DAO	KT958011	GIA DIEN/TEMP DUC	HAU NGHIA	PROJ SIGMA	CAMBODIAN, CHINESE

IV CORPS

C-4	CAN DAO	MS843116	PROJ DIEN/PROJ DIEN	LTC DALLAS	CONTROL	VI, CAMBODIAN
B-41	HOOC HOA	XS030909	HAU NGHIA/DUC HUE	LTC HILLARDEZ	CONTROL/S	HOUE
A-411	DIEN HUE	VS445915	HAU NGHIA/DUC HUE	HAU NGHIA	CIDG/SPS	CHINESE
A-412	CAI CAI	VS662073	HAU NGHIA/DUC HUE	CPT HILLARDEZ	CIDG/BS	VI
A-413	DIEN HUE	VS667032	HAU NGHIA/DUC HUE	CPT BAIGER	CIDG/BS/SS	VI, CAMBODIAN
A-414	HOOC HOA	XS028899	HAU NGHIA/DUC HUE	CPT HILLARDEZ	CIDG/BS/SS	VI, CAMBODIAN, CHINESE
A-415	TEMP. JOA	XS273773	HAU NGHIA/DUC HUE	CPT VAY	CIDG/BS/SS	VI
A-416	TEMP. JOA	XS974757	HAU NGHIA/DUC HUE	CPT HILLARDEZ	CIDG/SS	VI
D-42	CHAU DOC	VS731942	CHAU DOC/CHAU DOC	LTC BREWSTER	CONTROL/S/SS	VI
A-421	DIEN HUE	VS438468	HAU NGHIA/DUC HUE	CPT HILLARDEZ	CIDG/BS/SS	VI, CAMBODIAN
A-422	DIEN HUE	VS766310	CHAU DOC/TEMP DIEN	CPT SILEY, B	CIDG/BS	VI, CAMBODIAN
A-423	DIEN HUE	VS953712	CHAU DOC/TEMP DIEN	CPT HILLARDEZ	CIDG/BS/SS	VI, CAMBODIAN
A-424	DIEN HUE	VS843116	PROJ DIEN/PROJ DIEN	HOUE	NOT DEPLOYED	
A-425	TEMP. JOA	XS313955	HAU NGHIA/DUC HUE	CPT HILLARDEZ	CIDG/BS/SS	VI
A-426	TEMP. JOA	VS865304	HAU NGHIA/DUC HUE	CPT HILLARDEZ	TRAINING	HOUE
A-427	TEMP. JOA	VS664209	HAU NGHIA/DUC HUE	CPT HILLARDEZ	CIDG/SS	VI, CHINESE
A-428	TEMP. JOA	VS219445	CHAU DOC/TEMP DIEN	CPT HILLARDEZ	CIDG/BS/SS	VI
A-429	BA XOM	VS956629	CHAU DOC/TEMP DIEN	CPT HILLARDEZ	CIDG	CAMBODIAN, VI
A-430	DOU DIEN	VS13010	HAU NGHIA/DUC HUE	HAU NGHIA	HAU NGHIA	CHINESE, CAMBODIAN

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DEM LOCATION COORDINATES PROVINCE/DISTRICT OF CO-LEADER HISTORIC ETHNIC GROUPS

SFOB

B-50	THA PRANG	CP033514	KHANH HOA/VINH XUONG	LEO ROSSI	CONTROL	READE, CHAM,
A-502	THA PRANG	CP033514	KHANH HOA/DIEU KHAT	CPD DESSON	PROJ OMEGA	CHINESE
A-503	THA PRANG	CP033514	KHANH HOA/VINH XUONG	CPD WILSON	CIDG/SS	VI
B-51	DONG BA GIEN	CP040290	KHANH HOA/VINH XUONG	HAJ DOYD	HIKE FORCE	READE, CHAM, CHINESE
B-52	THA PRANG	CP031518	KHANH HOA/VINH XUONG	LEO HAYES	CIDG/TEG	NOTE
					PROJ DELTA	CHINESE

PHOBIC ATTEMPTATIONS:

CIDG - Civilian Irregular Defense Group
 BS - Border Surveillance
 S - Sector Advisory Role
 Sub - Subsector Advisory Role
 SpS - Special Sector

4 Annexes:


- 1- I Corps Camp Locations
- 2- II Corps Camp Locations
- 3- III Corps Camp Locations
- 4- IV Corps Camp Locations

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I CORPS

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
ANNEX I TO INCLOSURE I TO OPERATIONAL REPORT
FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING 31 OCTOBER 1966
(REF 6222-66)

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II CORPS



1-2-1
ANNEX 2 TO INCLOSURE 1 TO OPERATIONAL REPORT
FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING 31 OCTOBER 1966
(RCS 0002-02)

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III CORPS

MINH THANH (A-332)

MUI BA DEN (A-324)

TRAI IN (A-123)

TRANS SUP (A-301)

TAY NINH (B-32)

SEN 801 (A-321)

SUOI DA (A-322)

BAU DON (A-325)

00 DAN MA (A-126)

DUC HUE (A-351)

WHP HQA (03-25)

MIEN HOA (C-3)-

DIEN HUA LA-306**SAIGON (B-35)**

NO MSG YAO (U-55)

LOC MINH (A-331)

BU DOP (A-341)

SOME DE (B-34)

HON GUAN (B-33)

DUC PHONE (A-343)


DONG XIAI (A-342)

~~CHON THANH (A-385)~~

~~XON CAT (A-312)~~

XUAN LOC (B-31)

TANH LINH (A-311)



1-3-1
ANNEX 3 TO INCLOSURE 1 TO OPERATIONAL REPORT
FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING 31 OCTOBER 1994
(RCS GSPOR-85)


55

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IV CORPS

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1-4-1
ANNEX 4 TO INCLOSURE 1 TO OPERATIONAL REPORT
FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING 31 OCTOBER 1966
(RCS CSFOR-66)

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
REACTION TO INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

1. Purpose: The purpose of this analysis was to determine the effectiveness of operations in respect to reaction to intelligence.

2. Preparation: The analysis was prepared on a monthly basis, beginning with January 1966 and continuing through October. An acetate overlay was prepared listing all operations conducted in a one month period, and another was prepared posting OB information. By comparing the overlays in chronological sequence, the pattern of offensive operations could be compared to the reported location of VC forces. The general direction of operations and location of VC units were then isolated by the use of a specially prepared template (Annex #1). To further prepare the analysis for compactness and dissemination to subordinate units, the overlays showing the operations and the OB were photographed. The first photograph (Annex #2) showed the operations conducted. The second photograph (Annex #3) showed the OB and the third photograph (Annex #4) showed the operations and OB together.


3. Conduct of Analysis: To determine whether or not the detachments were reacting to intelligence, the overlays were placed on the map with the template on top. Through isolation by area of VC unit locations and operations conducted, the determination was made. For example: assuming that an "A" detachment reports VC units located in areas 2, 3, 6, and 7, and the majority of offensive operations also took place in those areas, it could be assumed that the CIDG forces had been operating where they expected to encounter VC forces. If the majority of operations were taking place in areas 1, 4, and 8, then it would appear that the unit was not seeking out the VC forces even though they were aware of the VC locations.

4. Conclusions: The analysis for each Corps Tactical Zone was expressed in percentages (Annex #5) of operations and intelligence reports by area. The conduct of major US unit activities within camp TACZ's which tend to limit the scope of operations was taken into account. Also the fact that operations into areas without intelligence indicators was considered. Overall, the analysis proved highly successful in pointing out the camps effectively controlling their area of responsibility as well as those camps which displayed weakness. Based on this analysis, guidance was given to those detachments requiring it, and assistance, where needed, was given.



Annex #1 to Inclosure #2 to Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending
31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)


HA TIEN
A 421
SEP



2-2-1

Annex #2 to Inclosure #2 to Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending
31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

HA TIEN
A 421



2-3-1

Annex #3 to Inclosure #2 to Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending
31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

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HA TIEN



2-4-1

Annex #4, to Inclosure #2 to Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending
31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

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OPERATIONS/INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS, I CTZ

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<u>DET/CAMP</u>	<u>NO. MAJOR OPNS</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE OF OPNS PER AREA</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE OF INTELL RPTS BY AREA</u>
A-101 KHE SANH	37	40%-4,8 20%-1,5 20%-2,6 20%-3,7	10%-3,4 20%-5,9 30%-6,10 30%-8,12 10%-7,11
A-102 TIEN PHUOC	52	25%-4,8 25%-3,7 25%-2,6 20%-1 5%-5	20%-4,8 30%-1,5 30%-3,6 20%-9,12
A-103 GIA VUC	29	45%-1,5 25%-8,4 20%-3,7 10%-2,6	25%-3 25%-5 25%-8 25%-10
A-104 HA THANH	29	40%-1,5 40%-3,7 10%-2,6 10%-4,8	40%-1,5 40%-3,7 10%-2,6 10%-4,8
A-105 KHAM DUC	20	45%-1,2 35%-3,4 20%-5,6,7,8	No Significant Intell Rated C-3 or Higher
A-106 BA TO	19	35%-3,7 30%-1 20%-2,6 15%-4,8	40%-5,9 30%-3 20%-6 10%-7,12
A-107 TRA BONG	32	60%-1,2 35%-3,4 5%-6,7	40%-2,6 35%-4,8 10%-5,7,10 5%-3
A-108 MINH LONG	LOCAL SECURITY		
A-109 THUONG DUC	29	45%-1 45%-4 5%-2 5%-3	45%-4,8 45%-1 5%-3 5%-5

2-5-1

Annex #5 to Inclosure #2 to Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending
31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

CAMP EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS

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1. Purpose: This analysis was conducted to determine the overall operational effectiveness of each Special Forces camp throughout the Republic of South Vietnam. Two factors were to be determined; first, was the camp operating; and second, were the operations effective?

2. Preparation: This analysis was prepared on a monthly basis, beginning with January 1966 and continuing through October. Three graphs were prepared for each camp, commencing with January 1966 and allowing for continuation until July 1967. To complete these graphs, combat operation statistics were extracted from existing records and plotted on the graphs as follows:

a. Graph #1: This graph contained the number of CIDG present for duty (scarlet); total operations conducted (green); and total night operations conducted (black). This gave a comparison of operations conducted versus present for duty strength. In addition it compared night operations to total operations conducted.

b. Graph #2: This graph contained company operations conducted (black); platoon operations (green); friendly initiated contacts (brown); VC initiated contacts (scarlet); friendly casualties (blue); and VC casualties (red). This gave a comparison of the overall effectiveness of the operations conducted in respect to the results attained.


c. Graph #3: This graph contained company operations (black); platoon operations (green); squad operations (red); company initiated contacts (scarlet); platoon initiated contacts (blue); and squad initiated contacts (brown). This gave a comparison of the three size operations to the contacts made, determining which size operation (company, platoon or squad) was more effective in obtaining results.

3. Conclusions: This analysis was successful in determining the two basic requirements, whether or not the camp was operating and if the operations were effective. Based on the results of this study, recommendations and guidance was prepared and disseminated where needed. A complete set of graphs was prepared for each camp and was distributed to the appropriate "C" detachments for continuance of the study. An example of the graphs is shown on the following pages (graphs omitted from copies 9 through 10).


3-1

Inlosure #3 to Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(RCS CSFOR-65)


GRAPH #2



GRAPH #1



GRAPH #3



SECRET

PROJECT OMEGA

8/

1. (C) GENERAL: Per verbal instructions of COMUSMACV to develop a plan for the consolidation of all in-country DELTA type Special Forces assets in order to provide a responsive long range reconnaissance and reaction force capability for the commanders of I Force V, and II Force V, Project OMEGA was activated.

2. (S) ORGANIZATION: Project OMEGA was organized as a modified "B" detachment, under the designation of Detachment B-50, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), with the following elements organized from existing CIDG assets:

- 3 Commando Companies
- 1 Camp Defense Company
- 8 Reconnaissance Teams (Recondo)
- 4 Roadrunner Teams

3. (C) MISSION: To provide long range reconnaissance and reaction force capabilities for the commander of I Force V, in conjunction with conventional force operations.

4-1

Inclosure #4 to Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(RCS CSFOR-65)

66

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64-8-87-120
HQ USMACV
8-87-218

SECRET

PROJECT SIGMA

93

1. (C) GENERAL: Per verbal instructions of COMUSMACV to develop a plan for the consolidation of all in-country DELTA type Special Forces assets in order to provide a responsive long range reconnaissance and reaction force capability for the commanders of I Force V and II Force V, project SIGMA was activated.

2. (S) ORGANIZATION: Project SIGMA was organized as a modified "B" Detachment, under the designation of Detachment B-56, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), with the following elements organized from existing CIDG assets:

- 3 Commando Companies
- 1 Camp Defense Company
- 8 Reconnaissance Teams (Recondo)
- 4 Roadrunner Teams

3. (C) MISSION: To provide long range reconnaissance and reaction force capabilities for the commander of II Force V, in conjunction with conventional force operations.

5-1

Inclosure #5 to Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

SECRET

67

64-S-67- 120
S-67- 248

SECRET

PROJECT DELTA

86

1. (C) GENERAL: Per verbal instructions of COMUSMACV to develop a plan for the consolidation of all in-country DELTA type Special Forces assets in order to provide a responsive long range reconnaissance and reaction force capability for the commanders of I Force V and II Force V, project DELTA was reorganized.

2. (S) ORGANIZATION: Project DELTA remained organized as a modified "B" Detachment, under the designation of Detachment B-52, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) with the following elements retained from existing DELTA assets:

- 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion (6 companies)
 - 1 Camp Defense Company
 - 12 Reconnaissance Teams (Recondo)
 - 5 CIDG Roadrunner Teams

3. (C) MISSION: Project DELTA's mission was realigned to provide the Senior Advisors of I and IV Corps Tactical Zones with long range reconnaissance and interdiction capability and to further provide a MACV Reserve capability for in-country operations.

6-1

Inclosure #6 to Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

G4-S-67-126

SECRET

2/8
3-67-

MACV RECONDO SCHOOL

.870

THIS INCLOSURE OMITTED FROM COPIES 9 THROUGH 50

7-1

Inclosure #7 to Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October
1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

G4-S-87-

120

88

THIS SPECIAL STUDY WAS PREPARED
BY THE 21ST MILITARY HISTORY
DETACHMENT, 5TH SPECIAL FORCES
GROUP, 1ST SF, 12 OCTOBER 1966

70

INCLOSURE # 7 TO OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING
21 OCTOBER 1966 (HQS CSFOR-65)

64-S-67-120

SECRET

**MACV RECONDO SCHOOL
(Long Range Patrol)**

1. (S) On 6 July 1966, COMUSMACV (Gen. W. C. Westmoreland) directed the MACV Staff to develop a comprehensive MACV Long Range Patrol (LRP) program in South Viet Nam.
2. (S) The purpose was to provide an interim capability in LRP until such time as TO&E LRP Units (LRP Company as defined in FM 31-18 and TO&E 7-1578) could be authorized, organized, trained and become available to South Viet Nam.
3. (S) As a result of the COMUSMACV directive, a survey of in-country assets and capability was accomplished in order to establish a firm inventory of capabilities.
4. (S) In response to this MACV survey, the CO, 5th SFG (Abn) 1st SF acquainted MACV with his particular capabilities and recommendations in a letter dated 20 July 1966. (See incl 1)
5. (S) As a result, verbal approval was given to the CO, 5th SFGA by Gen. Westmoreland on 21 July 1966 to initiate final planning for a Long Range Patrol School. Initially, this school would train selected personnel from conventional US units that were located in SVN.
6. (S) On 4 Sept 1966, official MACV approval for a permanent 60 student size LRP School was sent to the CO, 5th SFGA by message # 40096 (COMUSMACV) (Secret).
7. (S) The message further directed that the school would be known as "The MACV Recondo School" and that a distinctive patch would be designed. This patch to be worn only by school instructors, students who graduated successfully from the course, and by members of active Long Range Patrols. (See incl 2)

SECRET

6. (U) Between 21 July and 13 Sept, the Cadre for the Recondo School was selected. Personnel selected for this job came out of assets presently available to the CO, 5th SFGA 1st SF. The cadre selected were primarily personnel that had previous LRP experience in SVN. Additionally, they had specialized backgrounds in such areas as Medical, Communications, Weapons, Photography, Intelligence and Operations.

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In addition to their classroom instruction responsibility, the instructors were also placed as student Recondo Team advisors. When the students arrived at the school, they were assigned into five (5) man teams plus the one (1) instructor advisor. The advisor remained with the student team throughout all practical work and field exercise periods in order to observe and make on-the-spot corrections.

Attached as Incl 3 is a listing of the cadre, to include their positions for the first class of the MACV Recondo School.

9. (U) The first official class of the MACV Recondo School (A-1-67), began on 13 Sept 1966 with fifty-seven (57) students in attendance. These students were selected by their units as shown below:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>NUMBER OF STUDENTS</u>
a. 101st Abn Div	Five (5)
b. 5th SFGA	Seven (7)
c. 173rd Abn Div (Sop)	Five (5)
d. 3rd SAS (Australian)	Four (4)
e. 1st Inf Div	Four (4)
f. 1st Cav Div (AIL)	Nine (9)
g. 25th Inf Div	Thirteen (13)
h. 4th Inf Div	Ten (10)

Total Fifty-seven (57) Students (See Incl 4)

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10. (U) During the course of instruction, students were trained in tried and proven methods and techniques of long range patrolling that have been especially successful in the Viet Nam conflict. (See incl 5) Additionally, they were taught the use of selected pieces of equipment and "tools of the trade" that could assist them in the accomplishment of their Reconno Mission. (See incl 6)

11. (U) Gen. Westmoreland made his first official visit to the Reconno School on 15 Sept 66. During this visit, he was briefed on the status and operations of the school, number of students participating, program of instruction, and future plans. This briefing, conducted by Maj A. J. Baker, Commandant, was immediately followed by a demonstration on the use of the McGuire rig. (See incl 7) Gen. Westmoreland, accompanied by Lt Gen. S. Larsen, CO IFFV and Col F. J. Kelly, CO, 5th SFQA 1st SF, was then shown a rope climbing/rappeling demonstration followed by a detailed inspection and explanation of specially selected equipment used by members of a Reconno Team when they are actually engaged in combat reconnaissance operations. (See incl 6 and 8.)

12. (U) During this visit to the school, Gen. Westmoreland spoke to the first class that was in session. In his speech, he stressed the value of and the urgent need for the Long Range Patrol in SVN; how, by successful employment of LRP, the enemy could have massive ground and air fire power brought against him in an area where he thought he was "safe". Gen. Westmoreland also explained the word "Reconno" which he coined approximately ten (10) years ago while Commanding General, 101st Airborne Division. He indicated that the word carried the meaning of Reconnaissance associated with the fast, hard hitting action that was

synonymous with the highly successful Commando of W II, and the recognized team for the infantryman - "Doughboy" .

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13. (U) The first official Boondo class (B-1-67) graduated on 1 Oct 66 with Gen. Westmaceland personally presenting the graduates with their diplomas. (See Incl 9) The honor graduate was Sgt Irvin E. Herman of the 25th Infantry Division. (See Incl 10)

Of the fifty-seven students that started the course, 43 graduated.

14. See Inclosure 11 for additional photo coverage of Gen. Westmaceland's first official visit to the Boondo School on 15 Sept 66.

15. References:

a. COMUSMACV Hq. Hq. 23435 Subj: Long Range Patrol, DIO 081600Z July 66 (SECRET)

b. COMUSMACV Hq. Hq. 40906 Subj: Long Range Patrol Training School, DIO 041124Z Sept 66 (SECRET)

c. COMUSMACV Hq. Hq. 40097 Subj: Long Range Patrol Program, DIO 041127Z Sept 66 (SECRET)

d. LETTER: HQ, 5th Special Forces Group (Airm) 1st SF, dtd 20 July 66 Subj: Long Range Patrol (SECRET) (Inclosure 71)

93
SECRET

AVHCC-DH (15 Nov 66) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307
11 JAN 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOD-OT
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1966 from Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne).

2. Pertinent comments are as follows:

a. Reference Subparagraph 6p, Part 1, Section 2: The 5th Special Forces Group has been issued 70 Starlight Scones. On 6 January 1967 they were authorized to requisition 30 more. Other units are known to be experiencing similar difficulties. One, the 725th Maintenance Battalion, has submitted an Equipment Improvement Record (EIR) on the knob. This headquarters has initiated a recommendation to the 5th Special Forces Group that it also submit an EIR.

b. Reference Paragraph 1a, Part II, Page 46: Concur. Requests for point to point teletype circuits were sent directly to MACV J-6 for action. Point to point teletype circuits have been installed in the following units: B-55, C-1, C-2, and C-3. The C-3 circuit was provided using II Field Force Vietnam tactical assets. All others are using or will use the IWCS. The circuit to Detachment C-4 (Can Tho) is presently not activated due to lack of available channels.

c. Reference Paragraph 1b, Part II, Page 46: Concur. Mr. Aliphant Kubiluis, Lihon Systems, Inc, Westrx Comm Div, is due to arrive by 9 January 1967. He will be assigned to the 5th Special Forces Group. His contract is valid until 31 July 1967.

d. Reference Paragraph 1c, Part II, Page 46: Concur. Current production of the AN/PRC-74 incorporates a nickel-cadmium battery case and BB-418 ni-cad cells. In addition, the Electronics Command has developed a dry battery pack using 2 BA-386's (AN/PRC-25 battery). The new dry battery pack should be available about 4th Quarter, FY 67.

75

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REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED
FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES

G3-S-67

115

G4-S-67-

120

SECRET


AVHGC-DH (15 Nov 66)

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 October 1966 (RCS CSOP-65)

e. Reference Paragraph 2, Section II, Page 46: Concur. The augmentation of 110 intelligence personnel for the 5th Special Forces Group has been approved by the Secretary of Defense. Deployment of these personnel is scheduled for CY 67.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

34 Incl
nc


R. J. THORNTON
1st Lt, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

76

SECRET

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FROM CLASSIFIED INFO FILES

SECRET

95
GPOP-OT (15 Nov 66)

2d Ind (C)

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U) - 5th SFG, 1st SF

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 14 FEB 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

(C) This headquarters concurs in the basic report as indorsed
with the following comments:

a. Reference: Paragraph 3a(3), Section I, page 4. The
revised MIOE for 5th Special Forces Group is pending resolution at
Headquarters USARV in order to stay within personnel ceiling.

b. Reference paragraph 11d, Section I, page 25. The
revised FY67 Budget and FY 1968 Command Budget Estimates submitted by
MACV were approved by SECDEF. The revision of the FY67 Budget provides
for 73 PPS- Radar sets for 5th Special Forces Group.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

G. L. McMullin
G. L. McMULLIN
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

34 Incl
nc

REGRADED CONFIDENTIAL WHEN
SEPARATED FROM SECRET
COMPONENTS.

77

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

SECRET

HQ USARPAC
8-67-248